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VOIDABILITY OF MINORS' CONTRACTS:
A.FEUDAL DOCTRINE IN A
MODERN ECONOMY
Robert G. Edge*
I.

INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF

MINORS' CONTRAcrs

At common law the contracts of an infant are said to be voidable, but not void. That they are not void is made clear by the
fact that the infant can almost always enforce them against the
other party. In most cases it is equally true, however, that the
contract cannot be enforced against the infant if he cares to take
advantage of his infancy as a defense."
The reason for allowing the minor the privilege of voiding his
contracts was the protection of the minor. It was thought that the
minor was immature in both mind and experience; therefore, he
should be protected from his own bad judgment as well as from
adults who would take advantage of him. There can be little dispute with the reasoning behind this purpose.2

T

HESE tvo quotations provide a nutshell explanation of the law
of minors' contracts as it is often stated today and has been stated
for centuries in the Anglo-American courts. The doctrine of the voidability of minors' contracts-or, the "infancy doctrine"-often seems
commendable and just. For example, a boy such as the one in the
fairy tale "Jack and the Bean Stalk," who sold his mother's cow for
some beans, might be allowed to recover the cow or its monetary
equivalent if the beans were discovered to be worthless and not
magical. It seems desirable for the law to protect a naive child from
a crafty adult who would dupe him into such a bad bargain.
But consider the more nearly typical present-day application of the
infancy doctrine: A sophisticated adult-looking man enters a car dealer's showroom and purchases a new station wagon for use by him and
his family. He shows the salesman a driver's license indicating that
he is 25 years old and qualified to operate the vehicle. After signing
the contract of sale, the purchaser uses the car for six months and
* Member of the Georgia Bar, Associate, AIston, Miller, & Gaines; A. B. 1960, Univ. of
Ga.; 1960-1962, Rhodes Scholar, B.A. 1962, Univ. of Oxford; LL.B. 1965, Yale Law School;
MA. 1966, Univ. of Oxford.
I CoRBIN, CoNTRAcrs § 227, at 818 (1 vol. ed. 1952).
2 Comment, 50 U. KAN. CIrY L. REv. 230 (1962).
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then recklessly collides with another automobile. While he is liable
for his criminal behavior 3 in violating the traffic regulation and for
his tortious injury to the other driver's automobile, 4 under the laws
of many states if he is actually under the age of 21 years, he can disaffirm (i.e. void) the contract of sale and recover any portion of the
purchase price he has paid.
The purpose of this article is to discuss the general problem of
contracts made by minors and to question whether the result in the
modem illustration above, or a less extreme case, is justifiable.5 In
order to achieve these purposes, the infancy doctrine, what it is, and
how it is applied will be discussed more fully; and then the following
questions will be considered:
1. What is the nature of the goal which the infancy doctrine
allegedly supports and how did the doctrine originate?
8 See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 26 (1960); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 6-1 (Smith-Hurd 1964);
MIL.E, CRIMINAL LAW § 34 (1934); cf. Crasso v. Dean, 171 Neb. 648, 107 N.W.2d 421
(1961).
4 COOLEY, TORTS § 47 (rev. student ed. 1930); PROSSER, TORTS § 128 (3d ed. 1964).
5 Perhaps the best expression of the fact that times have changed is found in tile
opening paragraph of the cover story of Time, Jan. 29, 1965, p. 56:
Sociologist Reuel Denney notes with fascination the shopping list of a twelve-yearold suburban girl: "Water pistol, brassiere, permanent." When a 16-year-old Louisville boy, as a practical joke, gravely announced at dinner that his girl friend was
pregnant, the first reaction of the stunned family came from the boy's younger
brother, 13. "My God," he said. "You'll lose your allowance."
Contrast with this the description of the social environment in which the infancy doctrine is said to have gained a firm footing in our law:
No one can seriously question the basic reasoning upon which the right of the
infant to rescind his contract was laid. The law has always recognized the need of
protecting the infant from his improvidences and folly because of the admitted
immaturity of his mind and his lack of experience. This protection was even more
necessary at the time it was created. General education was not in existence, commerce was limited to Guilds, membership in which was restricted, industry as wve
know it today was not yet born; no opportunity was afforded for the foundation of
an experience pattern in business transactions of even the simplest nature. Children
worked in the fields, as apprentices in the trades, or were trained to assume their
positions in the world of feudalism. Such children were untutored in the wiles of
commerce and therefore easy prey for a designing and crafty adult. It was upon a
background such as this, in the fifteenth century, that we find the earliest English
authorities debating whether the infant's bargain should be void or merely voidable at
his election and finally resolving the question in favor of the latter theory. From these

times forward through the centuries, although the law has been modernized in many
other ways, the theory of voidability with the consequent right of repudiation under
any and all circumstances has been adhered to like a fetish by the English and many
of the American courts.
Miller, Fraudulent Misrepresentations of Age as Affecting the Infant's Contracts-A
Comparative Study, 15 U. Prrr. L. Rxv. 73, 74 (1953).
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2. Whom do we want to qualify for protection under the doctrine
and how should we make this determination?
3. Are the present rules made pursuant to the policy of protecting
contracting minors rational or justifiable in light of a legitimate
goal which might be formulated by a legislature?
4. What changes in our statutory and decisional law will best effectuate the conclusions reached in a consideration of the questions
offered above?
A. The Present Doctrine
If a person under the age of 21 years (or as low as 18 in some states)
makes a contract for the purchase of goods or services, he will be allowed to disaffirm 6 such contract during his minority or within a
reasonable time after reaching his majority7 and recover the consideration given to the other party, unless the contract was for "necessaries" 8
(a term which usually encompasses an actual requirement of food,
clothing, shelter, medical aid or minimal education and considers the
particular minor's station in life) or was made "pursuant to statute"
(such as those designed to allow minor's contracts related to educational loans or marriage). Disaffirmance is any act by which the minor
indicates that he does not wish to be bound by the contract made
during his minority,9 i.e., he exercises his option to transform a voidable contract into one which is void. If no prior act of disaffirmance
is proved, failure to disaffirm within a reasonable time after majority
has been reached may be considered a ratification; thus, the contract
becomes binding. 0 What constitutes ratification is a disputed question, some jurisdictions allowing mere oral acknowledgment of the
contract made prior to majority to be sufficient while others demand
a written statement from the former minor stating that he wishes to
be bound." If the contract were for real property, some states hold
the agreement to be void ab initio and there is consequently no need
to disaffirm. 12
If the minor misrepresented his age in making the contract, he may
be estopped from asserting his minority-in which case the contract
6 See 2 WILMUSON, CorrACrxs § 226 (3d ed. 1959).
7 Id. § 239.
8 Id. §240.
9 Id. § 234.
10 Id. § 239.
11 Ibid.
12

Id. § 227.
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will be enforced; or he may be allowed to disaffirm the contract but
remain liable for tortious injury to the other party. Some states hold
such deceit or fraud to be irrelevant. 18 Even though the minor has
consumed or lost the goods or services given to him under the contract,
he may usually recover his own consideration. 14 Generally there is no
requirement of a condition precedent, such as restoration, to the minor's right to rescind the transaction. However, if all or part of what
he received remains in his possession, this automatically reverts to the
other party's ownership upon disaffirmance.
B. An Introduction to the Case law: Clashing Values and the Extreme
Application of the Doctrine to Protect the Minor
A study of the case law in this area reveals a remarkable judicial
tenacity to the infancy doctrine. Indeed, one might well consider it
to be one of the most cherished and protected policies in our whole
body of law. Consider the following examples in which the doctrine
collides with other values which are often highly guarded or extolled
by legal institutions:
a. Liability for torts. It has certainly been the general policy of
recent years for courts to endeavor to hold drivers liable for their
negligent operation of vehicles when other persons or their properties
are hurt, in order to spread the risk.'6 However, when a minor was
transporting other passengers in his car for a small fee, a Michigan
court held that he was not liable for his tortious conduct because
allowing such recovery would be tantamount to enforcing a contract
which the law permits the minor to disaffirm.'0 In its zeal to protect
the minor, the court seemingly forgot the virtues of risk-spreading
which are so widely urged in our tort law.
Or perhaps a more egregious example is found in a 1950 Michigan
Supreme Court casel 7 where an employee of a business owned by a
minor negligently broke a gas valve at the plaintiff's home while in13

See text accompanying notes 115-34 infra.

14 See text accompanying note 177 infra.
15 PRossmt, op. cit. supra note 4, § 4, at 22. See generally James & Thornton, The
,.
PRon. 431 (1950).
Impact of Insurance on the Law of Torts, 15 LAW AND CONTEP
16 Brown v. Wood, 293 Mich. 148, 291 N.W. 255 (1940). The fact that the plaintiffpassengers were also minors presents an interesting question. Could they dlsafflrm the
contract which allegedly would have been enforced had the court not allowed the driver
to void the agreement? The answer is "yes" according to RESTATEiENT, CONTmAcrs § 431,
comment b.
17 Payette v. Fleishman, 329 Mich. 160, 45 N.W. 2d 16 (1950).
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stalling linoleum, thereby causing extensive damage to the property.
The court cited 27 Am. Jur.Infants section 90:
The tort must be the infant's own personal act. He is not liable
upon the doctrine of respondeat superior. Upon the ground that
an infant's appointment of an agent or servant is not binding
upon him, it is uniformly held that an infant is not liable for
torts committed by his agent or servant.
But in this case, the plaintiff had hoped to escape the general rule
because the operation of the business by the guardian's attorney-in-fact
had been previously approved by order of the probate court. Nonetheless, the high court was unmoved and stated that it was aware of
no authority holding that the order of the probate court could have
the effect of rendering the infant-defendant liable, as principal, for
the tort of an agent. Here the court seemingly went out of its way
to protect the minor, bypassing the entire modem theory of torts,18
in order to shelter one who could hardly demonstrate a need for the
protection.
b. Commercial Expectation.
(1) Bona fide purchasers.At common law, that oft-time favorite of
the court, the bona fide purchaser, was sacrificed to the disaffirming
minor who was allowed to trace his goods to the hands of third parties
and reclaim them. 19 The Uniform Sales Act -" and the Uniform Commercial Code 21 change this rule in those states which have adopted
that legislation. The problem is most likely to arise when a minor
trades in one car when he purchases another from a dealer who subsequently sells the traded car to a third party who usually has no way
of knowing about the minority of the former owner who (in states
which do not have legislation changing the common law rule) may
be allowed to reclaim his old vehicle after he has destroyed the new
one. The third party (i.e., the bona fide purchaser) may then have a
claim against his vendor for breach of warranty; but in case of a quitclaim deed (in a real estate setting especially) or an insolvent or vanished vendor, the loss would ultimately be borne by the bona fide
purchaser.
18 See authorities cited note 4 supra.
19 See Jones v. Caldwell, 216 Ark. 260, 225 S.W.2d 323 (1949) (held that Uniform Sales
Act changes common law rule).
29

UNWOR

21 UNWOm

SAirs

Acr § 24; Jones v. Caldwell, supra note 19.

COMMERcIAL CODE § 2-403.
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(2) Negotiability. The protection of negotiability has been a seldomsubordinated interest in our law, as seen in the Uniform Commercial
Code, 22 Torrens registration,2

and most uniform acts.2

4

In a 1963

child actor case in California, a District Court of Appeal said:
We need not decide here the question whether a minor may,
after a check endorsed by him has been cashed and paid, disaffirm his endorsement and recover from the maker and subsequent endorsees, in cases where the checks are not issued pursuant
25
to a contract approved by the Court.

The mere suggestion that there should be any doubt on this point
would startle many people who would find it inconceivable that a
modern society could tolerate or afford a result which would allow
disaffirmance of a check endorsement in such a case. It is the law in
some states that an endorser certifies the capacity of all prior parties
to contract so that the first person to negotiate a note (in almost every
case this is the person who does the actual business with the minor)
assumes the risk of the infancy.2 6
It should be clear that the various kinds of commercial expectations
are not equally important. It is one thing for an automobile salesman
to lose the expected profit on a sale and quite another for him to bear
the loss of a vehicle destroyed by a minor who misrepresented his age
in order to make the deal. Unfortunately, such distinctions have not
been articulated in the cases and one may easily doubt whether the
court always carefully analyzes the interests involved in the manner
which is being suggested here.
c. Judicial finality. In a 1954 Minnesota case, we can see an illustration of how some courts resolve conflicts between the infancy doctrine and judicial finality. In 1948 a court approved a settlement of
a tort claim arising out of an accident the previous year in which a
seven year old boy was injured. Following the settlement, the defendant was given a release from all liability which might have arisen in
the case. In 1953, some five years later, the order approving the settle22 See, e.g., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-305. See generally UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE §§ 3-101 to 3-805.

23
24
25
26

GA. CODE ANN. tit. 60 (1933).
See, e.g., UNIFORM SALES Acr § 38; UNIFORM WAREHOUSE RECEPTs Aar § 49 (1906).
Morgan v. Morgan, 220 Cal. App. 2d 665, 34 Cal. Rptr. 82, 86 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
E.g., First Discount Corp. v. Hatcher Auto Sales, Inc., 156 Ohio St. 191, 102 N.E.2d 4

(1951).
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ment was annulled by the court on the grounds of mutual mistake
concerning the injury to the boy's hearing because in the interim
period the boy had become quite deaf. However, the father admitted
that he knew of a deficiency in his son's hearing at the first trial six
years earlier but had assumed that it would not be severe and permanent. Concerning the validity of the release, the Supreme Court
wrote:
We have long recognized that a more liberal rule prevails for
setting aside a release executed in the settlement of a minor's
claim for damages for personal injuries than in other cases. Consequently, the settlement and release were overturned and new
liability was imposed on the defendant several years after he had
asssumed that the case was permanently closed.
Similarly, an old Texas case, 28 which does not seem to have been
overruled, holds that that salutary doctrine of final repose, res judicata,
is less important than an infant's right to disaffirm his contracts. And
it was not until 1965 that the California courts decided that a judgment involving a minor represented by his father and entered pursuant to an order confirming an arbitration award required under the
father's insurance policy could not be disaffirmed by the minor.2
The paragraphs above illustrate the assertion that some of our most
honored values are sometimes subordinated to, or at least shaken by,
the infancy doctrine. Surely it is a judicial function to attempt to
harmonize conflicting principles in our laws. However, in choosing
between clashing values, as the courts had to do in these cases, judges
do have some obligation to present a rationale for the decisions which
they make. The absence of such rationale is a sad commentary on the
judicial process. The complaint which might be made in any of these
cases is not that the judge necessarily made a mistake in the ordering
of values, but rather that in many of these cases, it appears that the
judge was swept to an unthoughtful conclusion simply because a
minor's contract was involved. As one irate dissenting judge has said:
McGovern v. Lutz, 242 Minn. 397, 65 N.W.2d 637, 640, rehearing denied, ibid. (1954).
Cannon v. Hemphill, 7 Tex. 184 (1851).
29 Doyle v. Giuliucci, 43 Cal. Rptr. 697, 401 P.2d 1 (1965).
The Tennessee Courts have determined that, under their laws, arbitration provisions in certain automobile liability policies may not be enforced in a case where one
of the additional insured parties is under twenty-one. Hickey v. Insurance Co. of No.
Am., 239 F. Supp. 109 (E.D. Tenn. 1965).

27

28

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 1967

7

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 2 [1967], Art. 4

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1:205

Every case involving a contract to which a minor is a party
should not necessarily be forced into the Procrustean bed of the
rule that allows a minor to escape responsibility for his other acts
upon exercising the privilege of rescinding his contract at will.U0
The following examples of cases in which judges have seemed to
stretch into the most grotesque legal contortions in order to invoke
protection for a contracting minor demonstrate further the tenacity
of the infancy doctrine in our judicial system:
(1) The Ohio legislature had provided that
... any person who is eligible for a loan under the Servicemen's
Readjustment Act of 1944 or any amendments thereto, whether
or not said person or his or her spouse is a minor, is authorized
and empowered . . . to execute any and all contracts, notes . . .
under the ... act of 1944. '
The policy here is quite clearly one of assuring lenders that loans
made to minor G.I.s will not be disaffirmable because of the infancy
doctrine. However, in a 1949 Ohio Court of Appeals case, 82 the minor
was allowed to void a note because a notation concerning the purpose
of the loan was made on the face of the instrument and not incorporated in the body of the note. This seems to be a flagrant disruption
of the justifiable expectations of the lender and a clear abuse of the
statutory policy.
(2) A California statute provided that a woman over 18 years old
and lawfully married could contract as an adtilt 38 In a 1950 District
Court of Appeals case, 84 the infant-defendant was over 18 years old
and married when she signed a note; but it was later discovered that
her husband's divorce from his former wife was invalid under the laws
of another state so that the defendant-minor's marriage was not lawful.
The court then reasoned that she had not contracted as an adult.
Allowing disaffirmance here makes a mockery of the rationale behind
both the infancy doctrine and the California statute since the divorce
requirements of a foreign jurisdiction cannot have any bearings on
the minor's ability to make contracts with adequate discretion. To
80 Byers v. Lemay Bank & Trust Co., 365 Mo. 341, 282 S.W.2d 512, 515 (1955).

(Page 1955).
32 Lambright v. Heck, 86 Ohio Ct. App. 456, 93 N.E.2d 45 (1949).
33 CAL. CiV. CODE § 25 (1960).
34 Nieman v. Deverich, 98 Cal. App. 2d 787, 221 P.2d 178 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1950).
81 OHIO CODE REV. § 3109.02 ANN.
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read the statute literally in such a case suggests that the court made
little attempt to understand the purpose of the pertinent legislation.
(8) In 1957, in Kaufman v. American Youth Hostels, Inc.,3 5 a New
York court allowed the administrator-father of a deceased minor to
disaffirm contractual agreements which he and the minor made with
a youth group which was traveling to the American West.
[T]he commencement of the present action by plaintiff as
Administrator of his deceased infant daughter constitutes a disaffirmance which renders the covenant not to sue, insofar as signed
by said infant, null and void. The fact that plaintiff, as her parent
or guardian, may have agreed to the terms or regulations governing the trips sponsored by defendant, adds nothing to the binding
force of the agreement because the approval by a parent of his
infant child's contract does not validate it (see 43 C.J.S., Infants
§ 71, p. 164). Under such circumstances, it is the court's view, and
it so holds, that the agreement to release or covenant not to sue
executed by plaintiff's 15 year old daughter is not binding and,
having been disaffirmed by the administrator, is void from its
38
inception.
The court implied that plaintiff in his role as father might be estopped
from suing since he had signed the agreement (which was not as a
matter of law void as against public policy). The results, however, are
these: (a) the father-administrator in the name of his deceased child
disaffirms a contract which he in his role as father had signed and
thereby makes it possible that he will profit from the tort action which
enriches his daughter's estate; (b) no youth group can rely on any
contractual agreement with a child regardless of the parent's consent;
and indirectly this means that the parents will have to pay for added
insurance to cover a minor child who travels with youth organizations,
although adequate insurance might already be held by the parents.
Again, the point being made is simply this: there is no need or
reason for thinking that in every case where some minor has made a
contract that the infancy doctrine must be deemed paramount to all
other legal doctrines. Especially is this true where the court must unduly extend the infancy doctrine in order to give protection to a
minor in a given factual situation, as exemplified in the three cases
just discussed.
35 13 Misc. 2d 8, 174 N.Y.S.2d 580 (Sup. Ct. 1957).

36 Id. at 589.
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C. Judicial Reaction to the Infancy Doctrine: The Other Extreme.
The courts have not unanimously protected the contracting minor.
One judge has commented that ".... for more than fifty years the policy
of the courts has been to impose more stringent limitations upon the
right of an. . . infant to avoid his contracts." 87 The cases previously discussed seriously challenge this assertion as far as some jurisdictions are
concerned, but it is nonetheless true that some courts have been moved
to complain, sometimes bitterly, about the application of the doctrine
in modem society. The following cases and comments provide a contrast to the decisions of those judges who have so tenaciously upheld
the doctrine seemingly at all costs.
(1) In 1918, a New Jersey court wrote in a typical case involving a
minor who misrepresented his age in order to purchase an automobile:
It seems anomalous, indeed, that youths of sufficient age and
capacity, although less than 21 years old, may be convicted of
crime, and be held liable for their torts, and yet not be liable on
their contracts when apparently of sufficient capacity to make them,
88
and when they procure their making by fraud.
This lament has provided the theme for many variations by student
law review commentators:
It seems anomalous that our law holds an infant responsible
for his torts, his marriage, and his crimes, and yet will not bind
him to his ordinary contracts. Such an attitude seems to be a
retention of the ancient ideas of an infant's inherent disability
to deal with his property. This is both unrealistic and unsuited
to our modem society8 9
These remarks reflect the frustration a judge or legal scholar must
feel when he tries to find some rationale for the doctrine in the larger
contexts of the law. Those who look for a common sense basis of our
law are embarrassed by the patent conflicts discussed in the quotations
above.
(2) In a 1934 New York case, Sternlieb v. Normandie National Securities Corp.,40 a minor misrepresented his age and bought some stock.
After the stock dropped to worthlessness, the infant repudiated the
87 Olshen v. Kaufman, 235 Ore. 423, 885 P.2d 161, 169 (1963).
38 LaRosa v. Nichols, 92 N.J.L. 375, 379, 105 A. 201, 203 (Ct. Err.

& App. 1918).
39 Note, The Status of Infancy as a Defense to Contracts, 34 VA. L. Rav. 829, 831 (1948).
40 263 N.Y. 245, 188 N.E. 726 (1934).
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sale contract and the court begrudgingly upheld his right to recover
the full purchase price. Judge Crane, however, was moved to complain
in this way:
As long as young men and women under twenty-one years of age,
having the semblance and appearance of adults, are forced to make
a living and enter into business transactions, how are the persons
dealing with them to be protected if the infant's words cannot be
taken or recognized at law? Are business men to deal with young
people at their peril? ... Well, the law is as it is, and the duty
of the court is to give force and effect to the decisions as we find
them. Some states have met this situation by legislation. 4'
(3) Some courts have felt that they were not so helpless in the face
of a contracting minor or so bound by the concept of stare decisis as
did the New York court in the Sternlieb case. As early as 1714 it was
held that one sued in equity may not escape, on the ground of infancy,
a contract induced by his false representations that he was of full
age.42 At that time Lord Cowper stated that if an infant is old enough
and cunning enough to contrive and carry on a fraud, in equity he
ought to make satisfaction for it. However, this view, at common law,
remained the minority position.
(4) The Supreme Court of Missouri has suggested that the common
law courts are equal to the challenges of a feudal doctrine in a modem
credit economy:
Protecting those lacking in experience and of immature mind
from designing adults developed in the common law of feudal
England. Y. B. 21 Edw. I, p. 318 (1292). The purpose is to shield
minors against their own folly and inexperience and against unscrupulous persons, but not to give minors a sword with which
to wreak injury upon unsuspecting adults. With the advancement
of civilization, the spread of education, and modern industrial
conditions minors attain a high state of sophistication. Many earn
their own livelihood and are more worldly-wise than their
parents.... The common law is said to be a growing institution,
keeping pace with social and economic conditions.... The protection of adults against depredations by minors knowingly employing fraudulent methods outweighs the interests of such°
41
42

Id. at 250-51, 188 N.E. at 728.
Watts v. Creswell 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 514, 22 Eng. Rep. 434 (Chan. 1714).
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minors, and adults should have available the remedies not founded
43
on contract for their protection.
There are two primary remedies not founded on contract which are
often open to a court. First, when a minor has induced the making of
a contract through a misrepresentation of his age, a court may allow
the injured party tort damages for injury resulting from deceit 44-a
position applauded by Professor Williston.4 5 Second, a court may impose a quasi-contractual restriction on the minor who is permitted to
disaffirm the contract. The real question is when such a contract implied by law will be granted. Most courts allow such a quasi-contract
when a minor has purchased "necessaries," 40 but the New Hampshire
courts have advanced a much broader "benefits theory" to protect the
adult party when a minor disaffirms:
The right to recover for necessaries is given because the infant
has derived a benefit therefrom. It is upon no other ground. If
the benefit is the foundation of the right, why should it be limited to necessaries? ... This has been made the test in the case
of lunatics and persons non compos mentis, and it should be applied in the case of infants. The true rule is, that the contract of
an infant or lunatic, whether executed or executory, cannot be
rescinded or avoided without restoring to the other party the
consideration received or allowing him to recover compensation
for all the benefit conferred upon the party seeking to avoid the
47
contract.
The court's logic is not faultness, since it assumes that the species
("necessary") naturally entails the genus ("benefit"). Nevertheless, the
idea has commended itself to other states and commentators. One
dissenting Arkansas judge would have accomplished the same result
by expanding the concept of what constitutes a necessary to include
the purchase of a truck by a 17 year old boy. 48 Seemingly the Arkansas
court had previously used a broad scope interpretation of the term

-

48 Byers v. LeMay Bank & Trust Co., 365 Mo. 341, 282 S.W.2d 512, 514 (1955). (Emphasis added.)
44 See Miller, supra note 5, at 75-76.
45 2 WILOSrON, CONTRAGCS § 245 (3d ed. 1959).
40 Id. § 240.
47 Hall v. Butterfield, 59 N.H. 354, 359 (1879). For a discussion of this case see Note,
Statutory Problems in the Law of Minors' Contracts, 48 COLUM. L. RaV. 272, 280 (1948).
48 Robertson v. King, 225 Ark. 276, 280 S.W.2d 402, 405 (1955) (dissenting opinion).
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"necessary" when it found that a minor was bound by his contract
of purchase involving a milk route and truck. 49
The common law's ability to hold minors bound by their contracts
may also be accomplished by remedies founded on contract For example, the concept of what constitutes a ratification is capable of great
manipulation. In Shepherd v. Shepherd,50 a promisor who had reached
his majority wanted to renounce a quitclaim deed conveying a life
estate in a farm to his mother. The only solid factor on which the court
could rely in denying the disaffirmance was the fact that the son did
not disaffirm for seven months after reaching his majority. Given the
policy that in many jurisdictions a person after reaching his majority
does not have to disaffirm a contract for real property and also given
the fact that silence is not often taken as ratification, the explanation
for the decision (which was disapproved by commentators',) must be
that the court was willing to expand its doctrine of ratification in
order to do justice, as it saw the facts, to the minor's mother. Such a
decision lends support to the proposition that the common law is sufficiently flexible to accommodate a more restrictive view of the voidability of infants' contracts.
(5) Perhaps the ultimate in judicial revolt against protecting a contracting minor is found in those states which have statutes requiring
that ratification be in writing. Section 38-103 of the Arkansas Statutes
provides as follows:
No action shall be maintained whereby to charge any person upon
any promise made after full age, to pay any debt contracted during infancy, unless such promise or satisfaction [ratification] shall
be made by some writing signed by the party to be charged therewith. (Bracketed word inserted by compiler.)
Nonetheless in a 1954 case, the Arkansas Supreme Court flatly refused
to obey the statutory command.52 A minor 20 years and 10 months old
bought a car, making a down payment at the time and after he reached
his majority 10 installment payments. He had recovered three insurance payments for three collisions, bought a new top at wholesale price
under the terms of the original contract, and had driven the car 35,000
miles. In the face of such facts, the court was unwilling to apply the
49 Haynie v. Dicus, 210 Ark. 1092, 199 S.W.2d 954 (1947).
50 408 MII.364, 97 N.E2d 273 (1951).
51 29 Cm.-K.m L REv. 361 (1951); 1951 U. ILu. L.F. 325.
52 See Haydon v. Hillhouse. 223 Ark. 957, 270 S.W.2d 910 (1954).
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1838 statute; consequently, it ignored the statute which clearly seemed
to be applicable although it had never previously been construed by
the court. The judge who wrote the opinion noted that both South
Carolina and Kentucky had similar statutes which on occasion they
had disregarded.
D. Some Legislative Responses Curbing the Minor's
Right to Void His Contracts

As indicated earlier, some alleviation from over-protection of the
minor has come from the legislatures. A student commentator in the
Virginia Law Review5 3 has noted six common statutory ways of holding a minor bound to his contract or allowing him to contract as an
adult:
1. Lowering the age of majority on petition to a court;
2. Reaching majority status by marriage;
3. Estoppel by misrepresentation of age;
4. Holding a minor to his reasonable contracts made while he is
engaged in business or else putting him under an affirmative duty
to warn those with whom he deals about his minority;
5. Forcing a restoration of the consideration (or its equivalent) if
the contract was made when the minor was 18 or older;
6. Removing disability of an infant veteran so that he could get
education loans under the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of
1944.
To this list we might add statutes allowing the infant to make nonavoidable contracts for insurance, for education loans and other agree54
ments made pursuant to statute.
A Columbia Law Review note-writer similarly has analyzed the statutory framework of the infancy doctrine and emphasizes the fact that
no state has all of the recommended provisions.", It further comments:
A survey of the present law of minor's contracts reveals a patchwork of common law and statutory rules. The statutes have been
enacted in response to isolated problems rather than in an effort
to create an integrated system of protection for the minor which
would not be unnecessarily harsh to the adult. The adoption of
adequate solutions based on a comprehensive analysis of the prob53 Note, supra note 89, at 831-33.

54 See text accompanying notes 76-81 infra.
55 Note, supra note 47.
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lems involved would be a significant step in the evolution of a
rational and equitable statutory scheme. 0
II. FF-uiAL OPIm AND PRF.SENT-DAY GoAL or THE
INFANCY DocnRmE

With this background, it is now important to consider whether we
need and why we have the infancy doctrine in our modem law of contracts. The rules-policies-goals framework used by the legal realists in
the analysis of various legal problems should prove a valuable asset in
the resolution of this issue. For example, if a goal of our society is
freedom of contract, the court might adopt a policy that contracts of
adhesion are not to be favored and pursuant to this policy adopt certain rules such as "ambiguities will be resolved against the party who
drew up the agreement." Such a scheme of analysis naturally requires
that one know clearly what the goal is (even if he cannot state clearly
why he chooses one goal over another). Assuming that the infancy doctrine is a policy, and that our search will be for a goal for which it was
devised and for rules to help effectuate it, it would be useful to investigate briefly the origins of the policy and to consider some of the justifications for it.
A. Did the Infancy DoctrineArise Out of a Concern for Minors?
Little is known concerning the reasons which led the 13th century
English courts to decide that contracts were not binding upon infants
because the judges did not fully articulate the rationale behind the decisions 57 They merely announced that infants needed the protection
afforded by disaifirmance, and this idea flourished without much debate. The first real controversy in this area of the law involved the
question whether infants' contracts were void or voidable, the prevailing view being that contracts beneficial to the minor were voidable;
non-beneficial and real property contracts were void; and contracts for
necessaries were binding. 58 But still it is difficult to find a real attempt
to discuss the assumptions and aspirations of the policy.
In an effort to supply reasons for the doctrine, one modem commentator has offered the following rather dramatic explanation:
While Nomad tribes might abandon to the mercies of wild
beasts their ...infants who appeared to be weak, the solicitudes
56 Id. at 281.
57

E.g., Y.B. 21, Edw. I., p. 18 (1292).

5s

Note, supra note 47, at 279.
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of our law makers for the welfare of the young and otherwise helpless individuals goes far back in our civilization. In fact, the protection of the weak, helpless, and unfortunate has been strongly
stressed in the religions of all our people from ancient times.50
To attribute this beautifully humanistic description to feudal England
seems plausible until one recalls that neither the law nor society in
general came to the child's aid in perhaps more compelling circumstances. 0 Indeed, it could be questioned whether it was really the
child's interests which were the matter of concern in the formulation
of the infancy doctrine. Under feudal law, for example, if a tenant
died leaving an heir who had not yet attained his (21 years) or her (14
years) majority, the lord was allowed the profitable right of wardship
and marriage.
Wardship bore no resemblance to the modem law of guardian
and ward, in fact it was the antithesis of it. The lord was allowed
full use of the land during the period of minority and was under
no obligation to render an account of his stewardship. Even upon
attaining majority, the ward had to sue for possession of the land
and pay a half year's profits for the privilege of receiving it.0l
If the minor had been permitted to sell the land, he would have been
able to come into his inheritance sooner; but in such case the lord's
opportunity for exploitation would have been diminished. Perhaps in
declaring infants' deeds void rather than voidable, the courts were not
protecting the minor primarily, although it might have been argued
that the lord kept the minor from squandering away his inheritance
before he was mature enough to deal wisely with it. But if protection
of youths until they had reached a certain level of maturity were the
object, this surely could have been accomplished at less expense to the
minors.
Furthermore, given the fact that majority for males came at 21 and
for females at 14, one wonders whether maturation was the real concern. There is scholarly research which throws into doubt the assertion
that capacity to contract had anything to do with the supposed mental
capabilities of young people. 62 The age of majority between the ninth
and tenth centuries had been 15 years of age. Later, for males, the end
59 Ellis, Basic Aspects of Legal Incapacity, 1951 U. ILL. L.F. 189.
00 See AuREs, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD (1952).
61 CRIBBEST, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 32 (1962).
02 James, Age of Majority, 4 Am. J. LEG. Hxsr. 22 (1960).
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of minority came to be the time at which most young men could bear
arms. Among other things, as the weight of armor increased and the
necessity for combat training required more time, the age of majority
was finally pushed to 21. The point to be made is simply this: capacity
to contract as-an adult was geared to the age of majority which was in
turn governed in large part by factors which had very little to do with
the supposed mentality or economic maturity of young people. And if
this might be true, the assertion that the doctrine was designed to protect minors is further cast in doubt because such a concept is by its
nature concerned with the minimal level of discretion which society
wanted a party to bring to the making of a contract.
Some English boroughs did follow the rule found in tort and criminal law that full capacity would accompany the attainment of the age
of discretion.63 Counting and yard measurement tests and whether a
child knew a good penny from a bad one were some of the methods
used in determining the question of discretion. One must wonder why
the law moved from this individual evaluation to a system based
strictly on chronological age. Surely, most minors who needed protection would be given it under the age-of-discretion test, although admittedly there is some juridical risk here. 64 Of course, it might be argued that courts did not want to make this determination in each case
involving a minor's contract. But oddly enough, courts were willing
to undergo such an investigation or juridical risk in tort and criminal
law situations involving minors. Furthermore, they did not feel compelled to adopt mechanical rules of thumb for what constitutes a "necessary," a ratification, or a disaffirmance.
Again, we must consider the possibility that a set chronological age
was used not for the protection of the child but for the benefit of someone else, for example, the child's parent. A father was due the earnings
of an unemancipated minor until the latter reached his majority.0 One
way to make certain that the father would not be deprived of this was
by allowing disaffirmation of the child's contract when he spent his
earnings on something considered foolish by his father, such as a pair
of boots. Also, if a minor sold his father's cow and took the money to
buy something for himself, the father could regain his cow if the minor
Id. at 23.
64 By juridical risk, I mean that a minor who actually was not discreet enough by
63

given standards to be held bound by his contracts might be the victim of an erring jury
or judge who decided that he was possessed of sufficient discretion.
65 2 "WILLSTON, op. cit. supra note 45, § 225, at 4-7.
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could disaffirm the contract. Arguable, at least, is the contention that
the minor might have been better off without the infancy doctrine,
although his father would not have been.
Admittedly, this is speculation, but surely it is worthwhile to question whether the infancy doctrine arose for the purpose of protecting
minors. Such an investigation may tell us to whose need the infancy
doctrine was meant to respond. The great danger is that the ancient
assumption will be presented to succeeding generations as a timehonored legal principle no longer open to question.
B. The Goal to be Served by the Infancy Doctrine in
Modern Society
Regardless of the actual early sources of the infancy doctrine, there
can be little doubt that today judges purport to be responding to the
minor's needs; but the protection is extended on the basis of many
assumptions which seem not to have been adequately tested and also
without a thorough consideration of the goal we are trying to achieve
through the doctrine.
From the ambiguous and vague statements in many cases, we might
suggest the following about the goal for which the infancy doctrine is
reaching. In our society we want to protect certain weak people from
being exploited by others because we take such protection to be a
worthy human aspiration. But this involves an investigation into the
sort of weakness we want to protect; and we can assume, somewhat
safely, that we want to shelter people who have not attained a certain
intellectual level from becoming the economic prey of other people.
The difficulty comes when we try to define the nature of that intellectual threshold and the only answer presently given is that a person
below a certain age is cbnclusively presumed not to have it while some
other person over a certain age is conclusively presumed to have it.
Let us stop momentarily to consider whether such a conclusive presumption is defensible. Justification for conclusive presumptions can
be found in at least two situations: (1) when we are so nearly certain
that the presumption's contrary cannot be shown in almost any given
case that we are not willing to devote any time to a consideration of
proof in its regard, e.g., someone under 3 years of age cannot have criminal intent; (2) when the possibility of showing the contrary is not
negligible but we are so interested in protecting a given interest that
we wish to avoid juridical risks which might damage that interest by
use of a conclusive presumption, i.e., our statutory rape laws which
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conclusively presume that no consent was given by a female under a
certain age.
Can the conclusive presumption that minors do not have the requisite intelligence we think is necessary for contracting be justified on
the basis that it is so difficult to show this that we do not want to waste
the judicial machinery on such a hopeless endeavor? The burden is
augmented somewhat by the fact that there is no objective level as such
by which to measure-surely no rarity in the law. But the jury is often
given such impossible tasks and there seems to be no reason for excluding.this sort of question from them. The cases show that often, if not
usually, the adult has a good chance of showing that the minor had
attained such a degree of sophistication that he should be bound by
his agreement. In any event, the courts are set up for making such
determinations, and they make similar investigations in both criminal
and tort suits. If an unscrupulous adult in fact takes advantage of a
minor's lack of experience, a jury can easily include this factor in its
determination.
If the use of a conclusive presumption here cannot be justified on
the "don't waste the judicial machinery" rationale, can it be defended
on the "juridical risk" theory? Of course, there will always be a risk
that a court or jury will mistakenly find that a minor who actually
needs protection against his own acts by prevailing standards should
be bound. But we are willing to assume this risk in tort 0 and criminal
law. 67 Furthermore, taking such a risk seems preferable to leaving the
adult remediless in the many cases where there seems little doubt about
the youngster's discretion. Furthermore, it is possible to offer protection against the juridical risk involved by raising a rebuttable presumption.
Consequently, even though the protection of certain weak members
of society might be a worthy goal, that goal does not require us to
have a conclusive presumption or rule that a minor is necessarily a
member of that weak class. This argument does not entail the assertion
that there is no age at which a conclusive presumption would be justifiable but only that the present level of 21 (or 18 in some states) years
is not defensible.
Let us now consider some reasons for doubting that the infancy doctrine in its more modem setting arises out of a real need of minors for
the generous protection afforded them.
See Note, 15 SYRAcusE L REv. 705, 722-23 (1964).
67 See id. at 712-15.
66
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First. It is now the accepted proposition that a child has reached his

full intellectual level long before his official minority ends. ". . . no
matter what experience may bring, the level of intelligence reached
at 14 (or at the latest 16) years will (apparently) not change nor advance."'8 Given the fact that almost every child is compelled to attend
school until age 16 and has access to television and other experiencebroadening media, there are strong grounds for assuming that a 15year-old or younger minor does know what he is doing when he makes
some contracts, i.e., that he has passed the minimal threshold of intelligence which deletes him from the weak class that it is our goal to protect. There are those who do not share this view 9 and admittedly the
answer on either side is not certain. Nonetheless, there would seem to
be some truth in the words of a Connecticut high school teacher who
wrote, "If Booth Tarkington were to write Seventeen today, he'd have
70
to call it Twelve."
Second. Continental Europe is not nearly so protective of its young
as are common law countries.
The European law... is radically different, not only in method
and procedure under the codes, but different in content. Justinian's lead in the Fourth Century denying relief to the fraudulent
infant is followed in The Netherlands, France, Spain, and the Philippines. The denial of relief by restitution to the infant is equivalent to estoppel. It must be noted that France has gone one step
further and recognizes the right of recovery in tort in favor of the
adult as well.
In Germany, Switzerland (and it is believed Austria) the estoppel theory is not recognized, but tort recovery in damages is completely covered in the codes and the infant is liable as well as the
adult.7 1
(1930).
E.g., Note, supra note 47, at 273:
[T]here is reason to believe that the average person in a complex modern society
attains maturity at a later age than at the time when the safeguards for minors were
forged. The longer period generally spent in school and the increasing complexity of
economic affairs are two of the many factors indicating that the need for protection
of minors is at least as great today as it was in 1800. It seems desirable, therefore, to
retain the present age of majority (21); but protection of the minor's interests should
be accomplished with the least possible injury to those who deal with him. To the
extent that this goal can be achieved, the reluctance of adults to deal with minors
will be minimized.
70 Time, Jan. 29, 1965, p. 56.
71 Miller, Fraudulent Misrepresentations of Age as Affecting the Infant's Contracts-A
Comparative Study, 15 U. Prrr.L. R v. 72, 78-79 (1953).
68 ISAACS, INTELLErUAL GROwm IN YOUNG CHILDREN 60
69
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More specifically, the German law reads as follows:
A person who has not completed his seventh year of age is not
responsible for any damage which he causes another.
A person who completed his seventh year but not his 18th year
of age is not responsible for any damage which he causes to another, if he at the time of committing the damaging act did not
72
have the understanding necessary for realizing his responsibility.
The Swiss make it possible for the minor to be held liable for his contracts or deceit in an even broader manner. "Where it is equitable the
court may decide that even a person under incapacity is liable to partial or full compensation for damage which he has caused." 73 The desirable feature here is the fact that the individual minor's capacities
are considered and there are no conclusive presumptions. Since there
is no evidence that Continental children are inherently or actually any
more intelligent than English or American children, the practice of
those Europeans might lead one to question further the need for the
infancy doctrine as it is now applied in the common law countries. A
different law is not, of course, necessarily a better law; but it may well
serve as a good reason for reevaluation of one's own position.
Third.
. .. the law seems to be settled that an infant is not precluded
from disaffirming by reason of the fact that an adult joined with
him in signing the contract. The fact that the adult assuming such
joint liability happened to be the minor's father would be immaterial. 74
This sort of reasoning seems most peculiar if the infancy doctrine is
actually concerned with protecting the weak. If the parent of a minor
72 GEmAN CvnL CODE § 828.
73 Swiss CIVIL CODE

5.1.1.28.

74 Hines v. Cheshire, 219 P.2d 100, 104 (Vash. 1950). Contra, Am STAT. ANN. § 51-504
(1947) which provides:
The contract of a minor when approved by the parent having control of such minor,
or in case there be no parent, when approved by his guardian or the contract of

any minor over fifteen years of age having neither parent nor guardian shall be
binding. Provided, that a contract with such minor shall not be for a longer period
than one year.
Compare Doyle v. Giuliucd, 43 Cal. Rptr. 697, 401 P.2d 1 (Sup. Ct. Calif. 1965). holding
that a father's representation of his minor son in an arbitration settlement may not be
set aside because of the son's minority, with Hickey v. Insurance Co. of No. Am., 239 F.

Supp. 109 (E.D. Tenn. 1965), which reveals that parental representation in an arbitration
proceeding is ineffective against the fact of one party's being a minor.
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child approves a contract, what possible grounds are there for thinking
that the minor was unprotected against some wily adult? Why does
the need which is asserted as the basis of the policy exist in this situation? The law in other settings recognizes the efficacy of a parent's
consent-even in a contract situation. 7 Surely it is possible that a parent might act in a way detrimental to his child but this would seem
to be a relatively rare occurrence. The point is that if the doctrine
really arises out of the needs of the minor for protection, this need is
satisfied by the parent's consent; but the law says that the child can still
disaffirm.
Fourth. Many states have specific legislation which governs a minor's
capacity for certain transactions:
... a minor is given full rights over bank accounts in his name
and a bank may treat him as an adult for this purpose. A credit
union has the power to sell shares to 'any minor over the age of
15 years who is qualified for membership.'7 0
A minor not less than 15 years of age as at nearest birthday
shall, notwithstanding such minority, be deemed competent to exercise all rights and powers with respect to or under contract of
life or disability insurance on his own life or body, as though of
full legal age . . . . 77
If any minor sixteen years of age or over shall procure a loan
upon the representation in writing that the proceeds thereof are
to be expended by such minor to defray any or all expenses incurred by reason of an institution of higher education, which has
been approved . . . , such minor shall be liable for the repayment
thereof as though he were an adult, and no plea of infancy shall
be allowed. 7

Of course, it may be argued that contracts related to education or
insurance most likely will be in the best interest of the child, but this
is clearly open to question. 79 And if this be a sufficient rationale, the
75 Children under 7 years of age cannot accept a contract offer and would always be
guests in an automobile with the result that the driver would not be liable for their
injury unless he were wanton and wilful in his negligence. But often parent's consent

will be imputed to the infants. Note, 36 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 146 (1959).
76 Note, supra note 66 at 725.
77 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 304.649 (1963).

§ 8-135.1 (Supp. 1960).
See Note, supra note 47, at 274:
. . . statutes have been enacted in many states unconditionally binding an Infant
fifteen years of age or older to a contract for insurance despite the lack of any pro-

78 VA. CODE ANN.
79
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infancy doctrine should then be changed to incorporate the "benefits
theory,"8' 0 i.e., the infant is bound to a contract beneficial when made.
Also, such an argument does not account for the first two statutes (the
bank account and credit union shares) mentioned above. These statutes
may be no more than interest group legislation; but, nevertheless, they
seem to be inconsistent with the usual theoretical underpinning advanced in support of the infancy doctrine.
That minors are often gullible and likely to be duped by cunning
adults who are frequently after their money cannot be denied; but an
examination of virtually all of the contract cases of the past twenty
years reveals that most of the minors who have been allowed to disaffirm their contracts were not in need of this protection. In the typical reported case, it seems that the minor probably should have been
found to be possessed of enough understanding to be held bound to his
contracts without society's being accused of failing to protect its weak
members. It seems that courts and legislatures rush in to defend minors
in cases in which there are strong reasons for thinking that the need
is not so great, and the cost of this misplaced zeal is put on an adult
who, typically, cannot be said to have taken advantage of the minor.8 '
C. Madison Avenue: A More Legitimate Case for
Protecting Young People?
Popular magazine reporters would direct our attention to another
sort of commercial seduction of youth and one that is money-wise probvision for ensuring that the contract is fair. Legislation of this character is justifiable
only if the subject matter of the contract is so regulated that it is certain that the

agreement will not be disadvantageous to the minor. Since agreements for loans
nder the Servicemen's Readjustment Act must be reasonable and provident before
they are guaranteed, and since the interest and amortization rates are fixed by the
Act [58 Stat. 291 (1944), as amended, 38 U.S.C. § 694(c) (supp. 1945)] there is slight
risk that such a contract will be unfair to the minor.
Ibid.
80 Id. at 280.
81 Niedland v. Kulka, 64 Pa. D. & C. 418 (C.P. of Montgomery County 1948). In
Niedland a minor lied about her age and learned some of Arthur Nfurray's trade
secrets and then tried to violate her covenant not to compete under certain conditions.
An injunction against the minor was granted and the court stated:
... the law should not allow a so-called "protective cloak" to be used by a minor
as an instrument for deliberately evading the dictates of common sense, good conscience, and a sense of justice. Where a contract is without mint of fraud or overreaching and is for the benefit of a minor, the minor should not be permitted to
disaffirm where such action would result in injustice and damage to the other contracting party.
Id. at 422.
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ably much more important: advertising aimed at the teenage market.
For decades the under-20 age group received little attention from businessmen, largely because the youngsters were correctly thought not to
be possessed of substantial funds which they were free to spend as they
liked. Recently, Madison Avenue has become aware of the fact that
there are over 70 million people under 20 years old in our country8 2
and that youngsters are themselves spending approximately $25 billion
or more every year.83 The average income of teenagers in the United
States is almost $500 a year.84 The average teenage income according
to the Small Business Association runs from $10 to $15 a week, with
no strings attached. 5
With these statistics in mind, businessmen can only be expected to
do everything they can to capture a share of this newly discovered gold
mine. As the promotion men and need-creators begin to work, the necessity for protecting the teenager becomes apparent to many. Some
businessmen have recognized the needs for self-restraint lest the youngsters be overpowered by the craftiness of the advertisers;80 and even
the teenagers themselves are complaining.87 Likewise, the subject of
governmental control of advertising has become more important in
certain areas.
The debate over government regulation of advertising is taking
on new urgency as a result of a rather startling trend on Madison
Avenue-a trend arising from the efforts of advertisers to capitalize on the spectacular growth of the teenage market.
* * * Teenage faces are suddenly beginning to adorn advertisements for every imaginable sort of product-beer, cigarettes, soft
drinks, automobiles, cosmetics and so forth. * * *
82

Bureau of the Census for the United States: General Population Statistics, Table

194 (1960 Census).
83 The $25 Billion-a-Year Accent on Youth, Newsweek, Nov. 30, 1964, p. 80.
84 Will Teenagers Make the Sixties Soar? U.S. News & World Report, Oct. 26, 1964,
p. 102, 103.
85 Current Comment, The Spending Teens, America, Aug. 4, 1962, p. 55.
86 The following statement comes from Coty president Philip B. Courtney:
Cosmetics promotions to impressionable teenagers should be free of exaggerated

claims, lush and overromantic appeals and promises of any kind which take unfair
advantage of the adolescent's deep anxiety concerning personal appearance and

social success.
Ibid.
87 Teenagers are not necessarily flattered by so much commercial attention. Several
years ago the student assembly at Lincoln High School in Portland, Oregon, rebelled and
condemned manufacturers who prey on "gullible teenagers." On the Fringe of a Golden
Era, Time, Jan. 29, 1965, p. 56.
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The basic question is simply this: since teenagers have a special
susceptibility to advertising, should they receive special protection
from the government?
* * * Media appealing to teenagers should impose a strict code
restraining cosmetics companies from using "scare advertising" to
peddle their wares. 8
Thus, there are strong reasons for thinking that our governmental
institutions have sometimes exhibited great concern for youth where
the need for protection is at least questionable and yet have chosen
not to act when the need for protection from advertising seems much
dearer. The British government has responded to the danger and now
curbs certain advertising which might be thought to be undesirable for
teenagers. s9
In reality, of course, the two problems (the infancy doctrine cases
and teenage advertising) are not so distinct as they appear above; and
quite naturally if a teenager is made to think that he cannot live without a certain article, the problems are definitely intertwined if the
boy then contracts to purchase that item and later wants to disaffirm
the contract of sale. But basically the need for protection from advertising lies in those product areas where impulse buying is more common-e.g., cosmetics or clothing-or where some harm is likely to
result-e.g., beer or cigarettes. The infant's contracts cases are almost
always concerned with much more expensive items which people do
not just buy on the spur of the moment. A young married couple
buying a home, a child actor making an exclusive contract with some
movie company, an employed teenager who purchases a car-these
are the typical cases where disaffirmance is allowed; and although
Madison Avenue might influence the choice of product the minor contracts to buy in these cases, the advertisers are less likely to have created the need that led to that contract. There are very strong reasons
for feeling that society should be much more concerned to protect
youngsters from need-creating advertisements than choice-of-product
advertising. Furthermore, it is certainly evident that television advertising regulation, for example, is a problem more suitable for general
rules and group presumptions than is a single contract situation where
individualized treatment and analysis is possible and more desirable.
88 Bart, Madison Avenue: Thinking Young, Sat. Rev., Dec. 8, 1962, p. 66.
89 For example, most tobacco advertising comes after nine o'clock p.

when it is
thought that a large percentage of the younger viewers will have been sent to bed. Ibid.
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D. Is a Policy Against Minor's Contracts Realistic or Desirable?
Before leaving the discussion of a proper goal for the infancy doctrine, one more aspect of the problem should be mentioned. It is
not uncommon to find judges writing that society does not want minors to make contracts or to engage in business.90 This comes close to
being an assertion that minor's contracts are inherently undesirable
and that keeping young people out of sales and business agreements is
good in itself. This statement (doubtfully) might have been true or
defensible in the days when teenagers were "in the class of a malt,
a movie, and 10 store perfume,""' but such an assertion today seems
both unrealistic and undesirable. The statistics would seem ample
refutation of such an assertion.9 2 With so many young people having
so much money to spend, it seems patently unrealistic to say that we
do not want them to make contracts or purchases, whether the items
be electric razors or used cars.
But a cold examination of the statistics shows not only that teen90 See Hogue v. Wilkinson, 291 S.W.2d 750 (Civ. App. of Tex. 1956).
91 Will TeenagersMake the Sixties Soar?, supra note 84, at 103.
92 Over 70 million persons in the United States are under 20 years of age. (1960
Census, table 159). Of these, 24 million are between the ages of 13 and 19 years. (Supra
note 72, at 56). There are over one million girls between 15 and 19 years of age who
have been married at least once (1960 Census, table 176) and over 400,000 of these have
had at least one child. (1960 Census, table 190).
For males, 14 to 19 years (totaling 8,101,561), about 40% are in the labor force, with
approximately one million employed full time, 1-h million employed part-time, and
some 300,000 unemployed. (1960 Census, table 194). The income figures for the 14-19 age
group (1960 Census, table 219) are perhaps most significant:
Male
Female
Total
8,101,561
7,933,738
Total with income
4,100,036
2,975,203
$1-999 or less
2,847,801
2,187,376
1000-1999
690,511
440,311
2000-2999
252,180
194,755
3000-3999
124,868
87,412
4000-4999
109,540
69,197
5000-5999
40,595
22,721
6000-6999
15,297
9,172
7000-9999
16,374
12,980
10,000 and over
2,870
1,279
Median income
720
696
Given the fact that many of these teenagers live at home, there is a large part of
this money available for non-necessary spending. And it is spent.
The under-20 group values independence, and the way they like to show it is In buying their own things with their own money. The boys demonstrated their rugged individualism by purchasing many items with their own hard-earned money. Your Teenager
is Big Business, American Mercury, July, 1958, p. 94.
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agers must and are going to spend but that many industries would
collapse if they did not.93 Perhaps the best way to illustrate this point
is to consider the following table which shows the percentage demand
coming from the 13-22 age bracket: 94
Records
Cameras
Cosmetics
Watches
Radios
Movies
Soft Drinks
Hair Dryers
Automobiles (new)

43%
44%
26%
30%
39%
53%
55%
28%
9%

Of course, very few of the teenagers who buy $100 record players
this year will disaffirm the purchase. But quite likely some will, and
there is little that a seller can do to protect himself against the possibility. Economically, he probably is unable to refuse to do business
with the minor. But if he does so, he is subject to "piratical attacks"0 5
from the teenager. Why should the Yale Co-op or Macy's bear the loss
when a record player purchased by some student is stolen or smashed
at a weekend party?"0
93

Today teenagers surround themselves with a fantastic array of garish and often

expensive baubles and amusements. They own 10 million phonographs, over a million
TV sets, 13 million cameras. Male teenagers own 2 million electric razors. Major items

like furniture and silver are moving into the teenage market because of growing numbers of teenage marriages. One third of all 18 and 19 year old girls are already married.
A New $10 Billion Power, Life, Aug. 31, 1959, pp. 78, 83.
In 1964, 60% of all first time brides and homemakers were teenagers-and there
need be no citation for the assertion that this is no small business affair. Supra note 83,
at 80. College students purchased over one million automobiles in 1964. Ibid. The Ford
Motor Company reports that every year one youngster in three in the 15-24 age bracket
buys a car. Id. at 81. According to the New York Stock Exchange, the number of stockholders under 21 has more than doubled in the last five years to a total now exceeding
450,000. Id. at 80.
Even the staid banking fraternity is today swallowing much of its traditional mistrust
of youthful high spirits. Today, Georgia's largest bank system, the Citizens and Southern,
is courting the youth market by providing more than 1,000 charge cards for students at

the University of Georgia. "Their credit seems to be as good as adults," remarks C. &
S. vice president Robert H. Kimball. But then he adds: "It could be a little better."

Id. at 81.
94 Id. at 80.

95 Comment, 31 YALE L.J. 201 (1921).
96 Cf., Dawson v. Fox, 64 A.2d 162 (Munic. CL App. D.C. 1949) (minor recovered

purchase price on stolen motor scooter).
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Furthermore, the statement that society does not want minors to
make contracts or engage in business does not always comport with
the vital best interests of the young person. If they did not make some
contracts, their training, development or opportunity for profit would
be seriously curbed. 9 The child actor or child with musical talent
immediately comes to mind in this regard. Also car pools where one
minor transports others may be not only economical but virtually
necessary, especially in our suburbs and rural areas which do not have
public transportation for school children.
III. QUESTIONS AND CONFLICTS TO BE RESOLVED BY THE RULE-MAKER

So far, the perpetuation of assumptions that do not seem to be
necessarily true have been attacked. It is the legislature's job to articulate more precisely the goal of protecting certain weak members of
society and then it must decide who is to be included in the protected category. This decision should be made only after a realistic
and intelligent consideration of who actually needs protection; and
such a determination would require more studies about the child's
capabilities, especially in regard to his engaging in various kinds of
economic transactions. 98 The legislature must decide whether and
when it wants to protect parents or other third parties indirectly by
allowing the child to disaffirm his contracts and should clearly enunciate its policy in this regard. 9
The legislature might easily decide that the best plan would be
merely to lower the age when one is no longer allowed to disaffirm
promises because of minority. The important thing is that this sort
of decision should not be made arbitrarily. For example, such a seemingl' small decision as that of making 17 rather than 16 years the
dividing line would result in the inclusion of approximately three
million 0 0 more teenagers in the protected category; and this group
represents billions of dollars of sales and contracts every year. Also,
scientifically we can learn that a 16 year old's typical maturation pattern is different from that of a 17 year old; and consequently the
97 Siegal & Hodges v. Hodges, 21 Misc. 2d 356, 191 N.Y.S.2d 984 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
98 International News Serv. v. Assodated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 262 (1918) (Brandeis,

J.,

dissenting). Mr. Justice Brandeis discusses the idea that the legislature is the only institution which can properly investigate some questions.

99 The UCC and the USA do not purport to deal with capacity in the various
Acr § 2.

states. UNrORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-103; UNIFORM SALm
100 1960 Census, table 46.
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decision maker cannot justify an uninformed guess about the relative
abilities of the different age groups.
Since the fundamental questions facing a legislator (the nature of
the goal and who qualifies for protection) have been raised, attention
should be directed to other traditional problems which a rule-maker
trying to rationalize the infancy doctrine might want to consider.
Possibly, answers to the more fundamental questions will also serve
as answers to the subsidiary problems, and it is undoubtedly true that
in many cases the attitude taken in the major decisions-basically,
whether to take a restrictive or a generous view toward protecting
minors who make contracts-will suggest most of the answers to other
questions.
A. Necessaries
Lord Coke once commented upon a minor's liability for certain
necessaries-food, shelter, clothing, "physic" and common law education--and judges are still citing the statement with vigor.10 1 Although
many courts have said that such contracts for necessaries may not be
disaffirmed, they have held that the proper measure of the liability
was not the contract price but the reasonable value of the goods or
services. 0 2 Conceptually this seems less desirable than the view of
Professor Williston, who says that a minor may disaffirm these contracts just as he may others; but that, if he does so, a quasi-contractual
liability will be imposed upon him by the law which he cannot
avoid. 03
Many states now have a statutory provision which mentions necessaries but gives little clue as to what this term really means. Typical
of these is the Georgia statute:
Generally, the contract of an infant is voidable except for
necessaries. In order to charge an infant for necessaries, the party
furnishing them must prove that the parent or guardian fails or
10 4
refuses to supply sufficient necessaries for the infant.
101 See Spaulding v. New England Furniture Co., 147 A.2d 916, 918-19 (Sup. Jud. CL
Me. 1959).
Necessaries in this section mean goods suitable to the condition in life of such infant
or other person, and to his actual requirements at the time of delivery. Uhi'roRm
SALrs Acr § 2.
102 See Lindsey v. Hubbard, 74 S.D. 114,49 N.W. 299 (1951).
103 2 VLusLoN, Comm.Acfs § 240 (3rd ed. 1959).
3o
Ga. Acts 1858, p. 58.
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This is, of course, no more than a reiteration of the common law rule;
and the legislature has obviously left the problem of defining the
scope of the term and the words "fails or refuses" to the courts. Judges
often analyze the problem in terms of two questions:
1. Is the article suitable to the condition in life of the infant?
2. Is the article actually required at the time of delivery?10
An analysis of the use of this discretion shows a definite trend
toward broadening the scope of what constitutes a necessity; 100 but, at
the same time, it is probably more difficult to show that parents or
guardians were not able to provide these essentials for the minor.
Among the more interesting problems regarding necessities which
need to be resolved are the following:
(a) Are loans for the purchase of necessaries binding on a minor? 01
Must a minor in destitute circumstances pay for a telegram sent to his
parents asking for money as a necessary? Surely the common sense
answer is that this should be included in the scope of "necessary," as
Professor Williston argues.10 8 Would a loan not made specifically for
necessaries but actually used for such be binding if the lender could
show that the money was used for necessaries? If it could be shown
that such a loan obviated the need for a loan specifically obtained for
necessaries which an infant would have been obliged to repay, the
answer seems to be yes. No case seems to have discussed the point.
(b) Courts are divided as to whether the purchase of tools, animals,
or vehicles used by a minor in supporting himself constitute necessities. 0 9 More convincing is the argument that purchase of items reasonably essential to one's means of making a livelihood may not be disaffirmed. 110 An extension of this problem is found in a determination
105 In re Peacock, 261 N.C. 749, 136 S.E.2d 91 (1964); Ballinger v. Graig, 95 Ohio App.
545, 121 N.E.2d 66 (1953).
106 Lawyers may well benefit from this trend, since legal services and fees under
certain circumstances may constitute a "necessity." See Porter v. Wilson, 106 N.H. 270,
209 A.2d 730 (1965). In Porter legal fees incurred in an adoption proceeding were found
to be a benefit to the minor, and consequently under the New Hampshire "benefits"
theory the adult could recover compensation for the benefit conferred although the
contract terms were invalid.
107 The answer at common law is "no." See Note, 36 NoTE DAME LAw. 552, 559
(1961); see generally id. at 552.
108 2 WILUsToN, op. cit. supra note 103, § 243.
109 Compare Russell v. Buck, 116 Vt. 40, 68 A.2d 691 (1949) (truck not a necessity
because of alternative means of livelihood), with Williams v. Buckler, 264 S.W.2d 279 (Ct.
App. Ky. 1954) (farm machinery a necessity for minor with family to support).
110 Bancredit, Inc. v. Bethea, 65 N.J. Super. 538, 168 A.2d 250 (App. Div. 1961).
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of how much education is included as a necessity. The traditional rule
was that only a basic common law education (whatever that is or was)
was included, but some courts now suggest that today a classical or
professional education might be necessary.
[T]here may be circumstances where the rendition of services
for such a minor are so palpably in his interest, and their withholding would be so detrimental to the development of his proper
potentials and growth ability, as to render him liable-in his own
best interest-for their fair value."'
(c) For decades courts denied that an automobile was a necessary.
However, in 1959 the Kansas Supreme Court said that since one had
to work to make a living, one's transportation to his job constituted
a necessity."- This case arose under a tort claim but it would seem
to provide adequate underpinning for a decision that under circumstances where one had to drive to work and a car was the only means
of getting there, the purchase of a car constitutes a necessity. 13 This
is not to say that a court might not draw a distinction between a GTO
and a 5-year-old Plymouth.
(d) It is generally agreed that the burden to show that an article
was a necessary is on the defendant when the minor is the plaintiff." 4
This would appear to be a close question: on the one hand, the minor
has much the better access to the information relevant to this inquiry;
on the other hand, to place the burden on the minor forces him to
prove a negative. The prevailing rule can probably work satisfactorily
as long as the court recognizes the defendant's unequal access to the
pertinent evidence.
M Siegel & Hodges v. Hodges, 21 Misc. 2d 356, 191 N.Y.S.2d 984, 989 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
However, an Illinois appellate court (Ist Dist., Ist Div.) has decided that a Dartmouth
College education is not a necessity, especially if the minor turned down a full scholarship offered by the University of Chicago. In re Johnstone's Estate, 64 IlL App. 2d 447,
212 N.E.2d 143 (1965).
n2 Ehrsam v. Borgen, 185 Kan. 776, 847 P.2d 260 (1959):
We are . .. of the opinion that private transportation for the worker is now a
necessity and an agreement made by a minor for such transportation is binding
and not subject to disaffirmance for the reason of minority alone. . .. Where the
trip is not purely social, any substantial benefit to the owner or operator of the
auto is sufficient to take the case out of the [Guest] statute.
Id. at 264.
11.3 But see Harris v. Raughton, 37 Ala. App. 648, 73 So. 2d 921 (1954) (minor also
owned a truck).
114 Spaulding v. New England Furniture Co., 147 A.2d 916, 918 (Sup. Jud. CL Me.
1959).
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B. Misrepresentations:Tort Remedy and Estoppel; Law and Equity.
The 19th century view was that a minor's lying about his age was
inconsequential because ".... a fraudulent representation of capacity
cannot be equivalent to actual capacity."' 11 The United States Supreme
Court even argued:
A conveyance by an infant is an assertion of his right to convey.
A contemporaneous declaration of his right or of his age adds
nothing to what is implied in his deed. An assertion of an estoppel
against him is but a claim that he has assented or contracted.
But he can no more do that effectively than he can make the contract alleged to be confirmed. 116
This seems patently illogical since the other party's interest in discovering the minor's age is to know whether or not to execute the conveyance in the first place.
The debate over the effect of a deceiving minor's fraud remains
active in many states today. There are two possible responses to bind
the defrauding minor: he may be estopped to deny his alleged majority, in which case the contract will be enforced or contract damages
will be allowed; or he may be allowedto disaffirm his contract but
be held liable for the tort (deceit) in which case a tort measurement
of damages is used. 17 Furthermore, an adult who during the executory
stage discovers the fraud may disaffirm the contract" 8 -a privilege not
generally available since normally only the minor has the choice of
voiding the contract. The courts refusing to find tort or estoppel remedies argue that to do so is tantamount to enforcing a contract which
the minor has a right to disaffirm.n9 Professor Williston cogently argues, to the contrary, that the tort remedy should be preserved:
Whether the infant is liable in tort for deceit in misrepresenting his age is not so clear. There is considerable authority that
he is not. The sounder view, however, is that the infant is liable.
It is conceded in all the cases that an infant is as a rule liable
for his torts and there is no valid reason why he should not be
115 Brown v. McCune, 5 Sandf. (N.Y.) 224 (1851).
116 Sims v. Everhardt, 102 U.S. 300, 313 (1880).
117 Merrick v. Stephens, 337 S.W.2d 713 (1960). For a discussion of this case see Note,
36 NoTRE DAl
LAw. 419 (1961). But see, Rutherford v. Hughes, 228 S.W.2d 909 (Civ.

App. Tex. 1950) (requires inducement by fraud).
118 RSTATEMENT, CONTREAS § 431, comment a.

119 Note, supra note 5, at 75.
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liable for false and fraudulent representations as fully as for other
torts, nor if he is in general liable for his deceits is there any
reason to distinguish the case where the injurious consequence
of the deceit is entering into an unenforceable contract from cases
where the injurious consequences are of a different nature. The
reasoning generally given in cases which protect the infant, "that
infants are liable for their torts, yet the form of action does not
determine their liability, and they cannot be made liable when
the cause of action arises from a contract, although the form is
ex delicto," does not meet the difficulty. The infant is not held
on his contract either in form or in substance if he is held liable
for deceit. 20
(We have earlier seen that a minor is allowed to disaffirm his contracts
for necessaries, but then is held liable on a quasi-contract theory.)12'
The Code of Justinian gave no protection to minors who misrepresented their age:
If a person who alleges that he is at present a minor should
deceive you by falsely stating that he has attained his majority,
he should not obtain complete restitution, as the laws only afford
relief to those who are mistaken with reference to what had been
legally established, and not to minors who are guilty of fraud....
Code of Justinian 2.43.2 (A.D. 293). '2120 2 WXLUTroN, op. cit. supra note 103, § 245. See also Byers v. Lemay Bank & Trust
Co., 365 Mo. 341, 282 S..2d 512 (1955). In Byers the court stated:
Liability ex delicto and liability ex contractu are based on different principles and
involve different measures of recovery. If an infant is liable for his torts generally.
the better reasoned decisions held he is liable for his deceit in misrepresenting his
age. His deceit induces the contract. It does not involve the subject matter of the
contract. The recovery is the damage resulting to the defrauded person and not the
contract consideration. He is not held liable on the contract in form or substance.
Id. at 515. See also Johnson v. McAdory, 88 So. 2d 106 (Miss. Sup. Ct. 1956).
121 Mehler, Infant Contractual Responsibility: A Time for Reappraisal and Realistic
Adjustment?, 11 KAN. L. Rv. 361 (1963):
Paradoxically, we declare the infant mature enough to shoulder arms in the military, but not mature enough to vote [in all but 4 states]; mature enough to marry
but not mature enough to assume the burden of his indiscreet business ventures;
mature enough to be held legally responsible for his torts and crimes, and yet, not
mature enough to be held legally responsible for those contracts which are often
the primary links in the commission of such torts and crimes: specifically, contracts
involving the purchase of a motor vehicle.
Ibid.; see 2 WILLSTON, op. cit. supra note 103.
122 Cited in Miller, supra note 119, at 78 n.6.
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Many American states have followed the same statutory pattern:
Contracts that may not be disaffirmed. No contract can be thus
disaffirmed in cases where, on account of the minor's own misrepresentations as to his majority, or from his having engaged in
business as an adult, the other party had good reasons to believe
the minor capable of contracting. Kansas Statutes, section 38-103.
One of the most interesting questions concerning fraud is what constitutes a misrepresentation of age. First, for example, the courts disagree whether it must be shown (by whom?) that the minor had read
the part of the contract which warrants that he is over 21 years of
age.123 Some states have evaded this problem by requiring a separate
written statement dealing only with the age, which must be signed by
the minor. 124 Second, is there such a thing as constructive deceit? 125
The statutes binding minors who "engage in business as an adult"
seem to be based on this theory. Virginia has a statute requiring minors
engaged in business to post signs to warn others of their minority.120
Third, are there other circumstances when the minor might be obligated to speak up and warn others of his right to avoid his contracts?
The cases suggest both affirmative 127 and negative 128 answers. A rule
of thumb would most likely not be satisfactory here, and consequently
29
it is better left as a question for the judge or the jury.
Should and will the court make law-equity distinctions in dealing
with these problems, and will it consider relevant the fact that the
123 Compare Martin v. Stewart Motor Sales, 247 Iowa 204, 73 N.W.2d 1 (1955) where
a minor was not allowed to plead that he did not read promise of age on the contract,
with Carney v. Southland Loan Co., 92 Ga. App. 559, 88 S.E.2d 805 (1955) where an Infant's
failure to read the contract clause warranting capacity was not misrepresentation.
124 E.g., MICH. Coawp. LAWs § 12833-1 (Mason Cum. Supp. 1945).
125 KAN. STAT. § 38-103 (1964). This section provides:
No contract can be thus disaflirmed in cases where, on account of the minor's own
misrepresentations as to his majority, or from his having engaged in business as
an adult, the other party had good reason to believe the minor capable of contracting.
See Pottawotomie Airport & Flying Serv. v. Winger, 176 Kan. 445, 271 P.2d 754 (1954)
(construing Kansas statute); Harvey v. Hadfield, 13 Utah 2d 258, 372 P.2d 985 (1962)
(construing statute similar to Kansas statute).
126 VA. CODE § 8-135 (1957 repl. vol.).
127 E.g., First State Bank of Oakwood v. Edwards, 245 S.W. 478 (rex. Civ. App. 1922).
128 Pae v. Stevens, 267 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1959) (minor's contract and action under
Torrens law).
129 See Evans v. Henry, 230 S.W.2d 620 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950); First State Bank of
Oakwood v. Edwards, 245 S.W. 478 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922).
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minor is suing rather than being sued?1 30 The courts often use "equity"
factors as bases for refusing to help a minor who has taken advantage
of an innocent adult and this seems commendable. 31 But it is difficult
to conceive of any compelling reason why different results should occur

because of these distinctions, and the trend in the cases is against the
bifurcation.
Courts usually do not distinguish the tort of deceit in the formation
of a contract, e.g., when the minor misrepresents his age, and torts
occurring during the performance of a contract 32 or the executory

period. Earlier, we discussed the cases of the teenage owner of a business who was held not liable when an employee damaged the house
of some customer and of the teenage car pool driver who was said to be
protected by the infancy doctrine when his negligent driving caused

injury to his passengers. 33 Primarily, this is a choice-of-values problem.
Since risk-spreading seems to be more important than protecting minors who have made contracts, liability in tort would seem to be the
better choice.
There seems to be no good reason why the presence of a contract
should whitewash tortious behavior. Those who disagree with this
assertion should consider the case of a young man who promises to
marry a girl and then proceeds to impregnate her. Is there to be no
remedy for the injured party in such a situation? In Sawicki v.
Sahor, 34 a 1933 New Jersey Circuit Court decision, the court held that
a minor who fraudulently promised to marry a seventeen year old girl
and then seduced her was liable in tort for $7500 damages to her, since
she had borne a child as a result of the contract.
I In the car pool example, it might be reasonable to allow the minor
to disaffirm his contract so that he is liable only for wanton and wilful negligence and not for ordinary negligence. But the main reason
for such a decision would probably be that the car pool is not the sort
of commercial transportation which is to be differentiated from socialguests transportation because it is a mutual convenience arrangement
rather than an operation for profit. A judge should be aware of the
130 See Annot., 90 A.LR. 1441, 1442-45 (1934).
131 E.g., Carmen v. Fox Film Corp., 269 Fed. 928 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 255 U.S. 569
(1920); Robertson Motor Co. v. Sims, 40 So. 2d 79 (Ala. 1949) (equity less protective of
one who has attained majority).
132 See, e.g., Garrard v. Henderson, 209 SAV.2d 225 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) (tort during

performance stage; growing out of contract theory).
133 See notes 4 and 17 supra.

134 11 N.J. Misc. 604, 167 At. 691 (Cir. Ct. 1933).
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difference in a tort occurring at the making stage (which is related
to the question of capacity) and a tort occurring during the executory
period or the performance of a contract (which is related to the ques.
tion of negligence).
C. Ratification and Disaffirmance.
The common law rule as to when a minor was obligated to disaffirm
or when he would not be bound unless he ratified in some way was
hopelessly confused. Some courts held that mere silence was never a
ratification but silence plus a retention of benefits might be. 35 Thus,
if a minor bought a watch on an installment plan and then lost the
watch, he was under no obligation to disaffirm and no ratification
would be implied from his silence. 36 It is somewhat puzzling that the
courts thought that they could satisfactorily determine the question
of benefit in this setting although they had dropped the same test in
the debate as to whether a minor's contracts were void or voidable
because of the definitional difficulties involved in the term "benefits."L3 7 The problem is acutely presented in a case where a minor
serves as an "accommodating guarantor" on the note of his girlfriend. 138 One court has read such as being of no "benefit" to the
minor but neither the reasoning nor the conclusion seems satisfactory.
Just how flexible the law is at this point is illustrated by those cases
which have allowed disaffirmance long after majority had been reached
-even at ages 31139 or 42.140 These more extreme cases usually dealt
135 Dixon National Bank v. Neal, 5 111. 2d 328, 125 N.E.2d 463 (1955); Cassella v.
Tiberio, 150 Ohio St. 27, 80 N.E.2d 426 (1948). See generally Annot., 5 A.L.R.2d 1 (1949).
In Dixon the court ruled that where a minor mother of illegitimate child did nothing by
way of word or deed to disaffirm adoption agreement after reaching majority, she would
be deemed to have ratified the contract because at the time of the making it ws to her
benefit. In Cassella the court held that an infant who is an accommodating infant on a
note gets no benefit and therefore does not have to disaffirm.
1386 Harrod v. Kelly Adjustment Co., 178 A.2d 431 (Munic. Ct. App. D.C. 1962). Harrod
seems to indicate that the fact that the watch was stolen while the buyer was still a minor
is an important consideration.
137 See note 58 supra.
188 See Mechanics Finance v. Paolino, 29 N.J. Super. 449, 102 A.2d 784 (App. Div. 1954).
139 Notaro v. Notaro, 38 N.J. Super. 311, 118 A.2d 800 (Ch. Div. 1955).
140 Lanning v. Brown, 84 Ohio St. 385, 95 N.E. 921 (1911). This court holds, in effect,
that a conveyance of real estate made by an infant may be disaflirmed and the land
recovered within a period of 21 years (statute of limitations) from the time he became
of age, where there has been no ratification of the conveyance. Contra, Almada v. Ruelas,
393 P.2d 254 (Ariz. 1965). In Almada the minors executed a quitclaim deed to their
mother when they were minors and did not try to renounce this until 15 and 17 years
after reaching majority. Disaffirmance must be within a reasonable time, according to

this court, and the delay here did not meet that standard.
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With real estate transactions, although it is not apparent that a good
reason exists for differentiating on the basis of the nature of the contract. Other courts have held that a mere acknowledgment of a debt
by the promisor after he had reached his majority precluded disaffirmance.l41 It is not necessary that the person over 21 know that he
could disaffirm a contract made while he was a minor.142 North Dakota
has a rather strange statute which provides that if a minor made a
contract before he is 18 years old, he can disaffirm within one year after
reaching his majority.14 3 This concretizing of the usual provision
"reasonable time thereafter" seems less desirable than having the legislature state its policy and provide for a flexible rule to be applied by
the courts in a way to carry out that policy.
Fortunately, American courts have not become entangled in a problem found in the English courts: may a minor avoid an avoidance?
The English law permits this 44 but the traditional rule in the United
States is that a disaffirmance by a minor is final14 5 (although sometimes
for real property he was not allowed to repudiate until he reached
majority). This surely seems preferable, lest the other party be put
in an impossible position of not knowing whether the contract is on
or off or somewhere in between. However, it is standard doctrine
that a minor may disaffirm a release given to an insurance company 4 0
and perhaps the logic there would urge one to the conclusion that he
can also avoid an avoidance. But surely consistency is less important
than giving a modicum of concern to the other contracting party.
Legislatures in some states have made some effort to control ratification, as the following Maine statute indicates:
No action shall be maintained on any contract made by a
-141 Fellows v. Cantrell, 352 P.2d 289 (Colo. 1960).
142 1 CoRBiN, Colvmncrs § 34 n.81 (1963) (hereinafter cited as COMLN).
143 N.D. STAT. § 14-10-11 (1960).
144 Hudson, How Often Can an Infant Avoid an Avoidance?, 27 SoL. J. 6. 10 (1960).
145 The conclusions suggested from this survey of the authorities are that when an
infant exercises his right of avoidance in respect of grants, gifts, leases and continuing

contractual obligations attached to property of a permanent character he may repudiate
his avoidance and the weight of authority suggests that this must be done either at
full age or within a reasonable time thereafter and not during infancy. If the repudiation is an exercise of adult discretion, that concludes the matter. Any later dispositions
of the property concerned will be completely independent transactions. If, however, the
former infant can show that the repudiation was not an exercise of adult discretion,
he may still set it aside. Further, both on authority and principle, it would seem that
the right to repudiate a repudiation is unaffected by Section 2 of the Infant's Relief
Act, 1874. 1 CoRBiN § 6.
146 Potirus v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 101 N.E.2d 620 (I1. CL App. 1951).
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minor, unless he, or some person lawfully authorized, ratified it
in writing after he arrived at the age of 21 years, except for necessaries or real estate of which he has received the title and retains
47
the benefit.
In an interesting 1947 Maine case involving this statute, 48 the supreme court held that the statute was not satisfied when the former
minor joined in signing a mortgage in which he acknowledged a premajority mortgage. Although this acknowledgment was in writing,
the court held that this was not the sort of deliberate ratification
required to make the contract binding.
The Missouri legislature has sought to be somewhat more detailed
on the question and looks to ratification rather than to disaffirmance:
No action shall be maintained whereby to charge any person
upon any debt contracted during infancy, unless such person shall
have ratified the same by some other act than a verbal promise
to pay the same; and the following acts on the part of such person
after he becomes of full age shall constitute a ratification of such
debt:
(1) An acknowledgment of, or promise to pay such debt, made
in writing;
(2) A partial payment upon such debt;
(3) A disposal of part or all of the property for which the debt
was contracted;
(4) A refusal to deliver property in his possession or under his
control, for which such debt was contracted, to the person
to whom4 the debt is due, on demand therefor made in
writing-.1 9
However, it has a different rule for real estate transactions and requires
disaffirmance in that setting:
All deeds, mortgages, deeds of trust and other instruments
affecting title to real estate hereafter executed by any minor shall
be binding upon such minor unless he shall file a deed or other
instrument duly acknowledged in the office of the recorder of
deeds where the land is situate, disaffirming the same, within
two years after the disability of the minority is removed. 160
147
148
149
150

ME. STAT. C. 119, § 2 (1954).
Reed Bros. v. Giverson, 143 Me. 4, 54 A.2d 535 (1947).
Mo. STAT. § 431.060 (1949).
Mo. STAT. § 442.080 (1949).
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The latter statute differs from older legislation which took the position
that some minor's contracts regarding real estate were void ab initio
and consequently there was no need to disaffirm. Such is the California
statute:
A contract relating to real property or any interest therein or
personal property not in his immediate possession or control,
entered into by a minor under 18 years is void and requires no
5
act of disafflrmance.1 1
There seems to be no good reason why an infant's contract should
ever be called void unless one is searching for a defendant who should
be insuredagainst such a risk.1 52 There is always sufficient protection
for the minor if the contract is merely voidable. In fact, it is more
desirable from the minor's point of view that the contract be held

valid since arguably such a description implies that the other party
can call the deal off and therefore possibly deprive the minor of some
advantage. Professor Corbin disagrees and argues that the other party
153
cannot get out of this "void" contract.
Given the usual modem theory that the minor's contract is good
when made and needs no further acts on either side, 154 it would seem
preferable to put an active duty of disafirmance on the person who
had contracted as a minor. The argument that a ratification after
majority is required often seems to go to the point of completing those
acts necessary to form a valid contract and not just to make a voidable
contract binding. Conceptually, mere silence on the part of the former
minor in the face of his knowledge that the other party is expecting
him to perform his part of the bargain would seem fairly to demand
that the younger party be required to make a positive disaffirmance
if he wants to exercise his privilege under the infancy doctrine.
Judges are fond of saying that an infant's contract may not be disaffirmed in part.1 55 This statement is usually designed to cover a case
such as that in which a minor wants to disaffirm certain warranties in
151 CAr. Cin CODE § 33 (1960).
152 For example, one who is injured by an automobile operated by a minor who latcr

voids the car purchase contract may argue that the transaction was void ab initio and
consequently that the automobile dealer is liable. This was unsuccessful in Semmens v.
Floyd Rice Ford, 136 N.W.2d 704 (Ct. App. Mich. 1965).
153 1 CoRBiN § 146.
3154 Scollan v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 35 Cal. 40 (Dist. CL App. 1963).
155 Putnam v. Deinhamer, 270 Wisc. 157, 70 N.W.2d 652 (1955).
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an insurance contract but ratify the rest of the agreement"56 Professor
Williston illustrates that the statement is not always accurate:
Bilateral transactions, not fully performed on either side, must
be affirmed or disaffirmed as a whole. When, however, an infant
upon reaching majority is under an executory obligation to pay
for consideration already received but which is not returnable,
he may promise to pay part of the obligation and this promise is
binding regardless of consideration or mutual assent. Whether or
not this partial ratification involves an implication of disaffirmance of the balance of the obligation is a question of fact. To
the extent that it does, it seems that partial disaffirmance is
157
possible.
This seems to explain some decisions which appear to have taken a
middle ground,158 e.g., allowing a minor to disaffirm a contract of
sale for a horse but not allowing her to avoid paying for the stable fees
for the horse for the period prior to disaffirmance.' 50
Can a minor disaffirm a contract executed with another minor? The
District of Columbia Court of Appeals in a 1963 case said yes:
The law renders an infant's contracts unenforceable to protect
infants from improvident bargains and injustice. It seeks to restore
the infant to his position prior to contracting. We feel these rules
are equally applicable when both parties are infants.100
The defendant in this case said that there was no evidence that he still
had the consideration and he cited two cases in which the courts refused to rescind a contract between two infants because the defendant
had spent the money before the plaintiff sought to avoid the contract.
The court was not moved by this argument since it found no allegation that restoration was impossible in this case.
May a minor disaffirm a contract when the avoidance is not for
his own benefit? In a 1953 Alabama case' 01 a minor who had pur156 Hunter v. Travelers Ins. Co., 131 So. 2d 209 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961); Modern
Woodmen of America v. Stevens, 70 Ariz. 232, 219 P.2d 322 (1950).
157 2 WILUSTON, op. cit. supra note 103, § 236.
158 Reggiori v. Forbes, 128 N.J.L. 319, 26 A.2d 145 (1942).
159 Holman v. Hudson, 67 N.Y.S.2d 615 (Sup. Ct. 1946); accord, Dobson v. Rosini, 20
Pa. D. & C.2d 537 (C. P. Northumberland County 1959). In Dobson it was held that a
minor could get back the sale price of a car but not the money spent for repairs.
160 Hunvitz v. Barr, 193 A.2d 360 (D.C. Ct. App. 1963).
161 Holmes v. Honston, 259 Ala. 358, 67 So.2d 14 (1953).
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chased an automobile with stolen money wanted to rescind and recover
the consideration paid. The defense was that since the plaintiff-infant
had no title to the property, he would not be entitled to rescind. The
court disagreed and cited a Connecticut case holding that it was immaterial how he might have come into possession of the money and
that this inquiry was beside the point. But is it beside the point and
should the question whether the robbed person or the seller should
bear the loss be decided on the basis of the infancy doctrine?0 2 Should
an insurance company be the real party protected by the doctrine,
10 3
especially when this is injurious to other minors?
D. Restoration and Claims for Depreciation
Closely connected with the disaffirmation-ratification problem are
the obligations of the minors before or after' avoiding the contract. The
traditional dogma has been that the minor does not have to offer to
return the property, if there be any remaining, or its equivalent, before he is allowed to disaffirm:
If the infant in every case is bound to return the consideration
received or the equivalent in order to avoid his contract, the protection afforded him as an infant is seriously impaired or destroyed, for it is precisely because the infant is supposed to be improvident and likely to misuse or squander what he received that
his contract is voidable. 1 4
Theoretically, it is said that at the moment of effective disaffirmance,
ownership of any property reverts to the other party'0 5 and the minor
will be liable for misuse of the property.1 0 Some courts have suggested
that the minor is accountable by way of recoupment also for any wan162 See note 96 supra. Similarly, should the whim of a minor determine whether a

finance company or an automobile dealer bears the loss and risk of the transaction? See
Keser v. Chagnon, 410 P.2d 637 (Colo. 1966).
163 In Moblard v. Klippenstein, 239 F. Supp. 274 (W.D. Mid. 1965) a 20 year old
driver drove a skiing group on a holiday and was compensated for his expenses. Follow.
ing an accident, he disairmed the "contract," so that a different standard of liability
was applicable since his former "customers" became "guests."
36 Bevilacqua v. Belisimo, 41 West. 111 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1958); accord, Sparks v. Sparks,
101 Cal. App. 2d 129, 225 P.2d 238 (1950).
165 Gage v. Moore, 198 P.2d 395 (Okla. 1948); Holmes Co. v. Rena, 34 So. 2d 813 (La.
Ct. App. 1948).
166 Fisher v. Taylor, 249 N.C. 617, 107 S.E.2d 94 (1959); see Loomis v. Imperial Motors,
396 P.2d 467 (Idaho 1964) (minor is a "gratuitous bailee" in the interim period); Note,
37 N.C.L. REv. 484 (1959). But see Adams v. Barcomb, 216 A.2d 648 (Vt. 196). In Adams
the court held that, after a minor proffers a return, he is not liable for rental on the
goods when the other party refuses to recognize that the contract has been disaflirmed.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 1967

41

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 2 [1967], Art. 4
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1:205

ton or wilful damage to the property prior to disaffirmance,10 7 apparently reasoning that the adult in dealing with the infant only assumes
the risk of his improvidence and lack of discretion and should not be
required to suffer loss from the minor's wilful and wanton acts.
One of the great debates in this area of the law has centered on the
minor's liability for the use or depreciation of the property prior to
disaffirmance. The problem is especially acute when the contract in8
cannot be returned.
volves intangibles-such as voice lessons"1 -which
Williston urges the minority rule which makes the minor pay for the
benefits he has received, often measured in terms of the amount of depreciation.1 69 This smacks of quasi-contract notions, such as that in the
"necessaries" cases. The United States Supreme Court has allowed such
recoupment on "equitable principles. ' 17 0 A 1951 Ohio case went further and held the minor to be the proper party to bear the loss from a
171
decline in market value.
The typical statutory answer has been that for contracts made by the
minor while he was under 18 years of age, there is no liability for the
use or depreciation, whereas there is if the contract was made after he
167 Fisher v. Taylor, supra note 166. See also Union Nat. Bank of Troy v. Corey, 93
N.Y.S.2d 35 (Troy City Ct. 1949).
168 Icovino v. Haymes, 191 Misc. 311, 77 N.Y.S.2d 316 (Munic. Ct. N.Y.C. 1948).
169 2 WILUSTON, CONTRACTS § 238, at 41-42 (3d ed. 1959).
Though the weight of authority still permits an infant vendee to recover the price
paid merely upon offering to return the property, if any, remaining in his hands,
without accounting to the vendor for its depredation or use, there is an increasing
number of jurisdictions which allow the vendor to deduct for such depredation
and use. In view of the general education and early sophistication of youth, when
minors commonly transact a considerable volume of business on their own behalf,
the latter view which rests upon the equitable basis that, if the contract is fair and
reasonable, then the minor should not be permitted to overreach any more than
the adult seems dearly the better. Some of these cases have emphasized the infant's
misrepresentation of age, but this would seem merely an incidental step toward the
recognition of the broader underlying principle.
Ibid.; see Merrick v. Stevens, 337 S.W.2d 713 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960):
And there is authority to the effect that if the contract was for the benefit of the
infant and the benefits received are of such nature that they cannot be returned
or restored, then there can be no rescission.
Id. at 718.
The other side of the coin is found in Jim Walter Corp. v. Hunt, 183 So.2d 91 (La. Ct.
App. 1965), where it was held that after disaffirmance, the seller of a shell home could
reclaim it from the minor purchaser, but would have to pay the minor for any improve.
ments made by the latter.
170 Myers v. Hurley Motor Co., 273 U.S. 18 (1926).
171 Rush v. Grevey, 90 Ohio App. 536, 107 N.E.2d 560 (1951).
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reached that age.17 2 In case the property has been damaged or is otherwise nonreturnable, he is required to return its fair market value. 7 3
Ohio requires restoration when there has been a misrepresentation of
74
age.1
The bite of these statutes may be greatly affected by decisions regarding the burdens of proof. South Dakota says that the infant is obligated to show no depreciation. 175 A 1956 Rhode Island case1 70 said that
the burden of showing that the minor could not return the engagement ring to the seller was not on the minor because this places a condition precedent on his right to disaffirm. It would seem that this question should be decided with some consideration of procedural policy
and not solely on the basis of the substantive doctrine itself. 177
Akin to this problem is the question whether an infant whose part
of the bargain is executory may sue another for specific performance' 7 s
or breach of contract. 7 9 The negative argument is that a court should
not allow this because it cannot be sure that the minor will in turn
perform his part of the bargain. Although the experts are in disagreement,8 0 it seems that the court could examine the contract; and if it
finds that the agreement is fair, it could then remove the infancy element as a factor in its determination and also deprive the minor of his
right to disaffirm in case his action is upheld.""s
E. Terminating the Right of Disaffirmance: Special
Statutes; Marriage; Emancipation
Taking their cue from the Romans, 8 2- some state legislatures have
provided that certain minors may be given the status of adults for purposes of contracting if a court finds this would be to their material
172 N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-10-11 (1960).

173 AR& STAT. ANN. § 68-1601 (1947).
174 Morton v. Luchin, 88 Ohio 75, 96 N.E.2d 784 (1950).

175 Barber v. Gross, 74 S.D. 254,51 N.W.2d 696 (1952).
178 Rotondo v. Kay Jewelry Co., 123 A.2d 404 (R. 1956). The Missouri rule is similar.
See Nelson v. Browning, 391 S.W.2d 873 (Mo. 1965).
177 Note, 2 VEU. L. REV. 269, 270 (1957).
178 Gershenson, Can an Infant Obtain Specific Perfornance of a Contract to Purdase
Real Property?, 22 BRooKLYN L. REv. 49 (1956), citing WnMLsroN, CO.MACTS § 1438, n.3
(3d ed. 1959); 5A CoRBiN § 1203; REsTAIEMzENT, Co mmcrs § 376, illustration 1 (1932).
179 Parks v. Lyons, 219 S.C. 40, 64 S.E.2d 123 (1951). The court in Parks required an
infant who wanted to sue for breach of contract to how that he was able and ready to
perform his part of the bargain.
180 See note 178 supra.
181 1 ComIN § 142.
182 James, supra note 62, at 24.
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advantage. s3 However, such action may be limited to the jurisdiction
covered by the court granting the majority capacity. 8 4 Some commentators have disapproved a general lifting of the disability and suggest
that a better plan is to restrict the removal to contracts for services of
the minor. On the contrary, some respected legal commentators find
this disability-removing procedure to be salutary and urge its broadscale use.'8 5
At common law, marriage did not affect one's capacity; 8 0 and it can
be argued that the mere fact of marriage, like emancipation, has little
to do with a minor's possessing sufficient maturity so that he can contract as an adult

8 7

Indeed many marriages may be clear evidence of

the contrary. But if a minor-wife is spending the money of her adult
husband, the courts can become involved in a seemingly useless inquiry as to her rights of disaffirmance.18 8 Perhaps the Germans have
suggested the preferable answer in their code provision which says that
if a statutory agent (a person who has certain guardianship rights over
the child) makes funds available to a minor and the minor spends them
as his own, then such contracts may not be avoided. 18° (Note that this
involves a polity determination as to when the legislature wants to protect an adult indirectly through the infancy doctrine.) Many American
states now have legislation providing that a female arrives at her majority for purposes of contracting when she marries' 00 or when she is
over 18 and married' 91 or when she marries a male of full age.10 2 Some
of these statutes provide that such capacity to contract as an adult lasts
"while such marriage exists" and thus majority may be lost if the marriage is terminated.0 3 Sometimes a plausible case might be made for
183 TEx. STAT.

§ 5921 (1962):

Minors above the age of 19 years, where it shall appear to their material advantage,
may have their disabilities of minority removed and be thereafter held, for all legal
purposes, of full age, except as to the right to vote.
Also KAN. REV. CIv. STAT. § 38-108 (1963) and ARK. STAT. §§ 34-2001, 2002 (1947).
184 See Nelson v. Browning, 391 S.W.2d 873 (Mo. 1965). The Missouri Supreme Court
ruled that the Arkansas court's removal of disabilities from a minor could not affect
laws governing capacity in Missouri.
185 Note, supra note 39, at 832.
186 Bixler v. Adair, Pa. 22 D. & C.2d 732, 57 Lanv. Rev. 197 (Lancaster County Ct. 1959).
See 2 WrLuSTON, CONTRACrS § 225 (3d ed. 1959).
187 Note, supra note 39, at 833.
188 See, e.g., O'Brien v. Small, 122 N.E.2d 701 (Ct. App. Ohio 1954).
189 Miller, supra note 5, at 78, citing GERMAN CIVIL CODE §§ 108 & 110.
190 See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 25.20.020 (1962).
191 See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. § 25-212 (1956).
192 See, e.g., WAsH. REv. CODE § 26.28.020 (1961).
193 See, e.g., KAN. GEN. STAT. § 38-101 (1963); text accompanying note 34 supra.
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such a provision when the marriage is annulled; but in a termination
by divorce, separation, or death1 94 the logic seems obscure.
A stock argument of someone trying to hold a minor liable for his
contract is that the minor has been "emancipated." This means that
the parents or guardians of the child have surrendered the right to the
care, custody and earnings of such child as well as a renunciation of
parental duties.195 Emancipation is said to be irrelevant to capacity,
although it may have peripheral effects, such as enlarging the scope of
what constitutes a necessity. 196 An emancipated minor is involved in
most of the reported cases involving the infancy doctrine and there are
strong reasons for thinking that emancipation should be significant to
some degree. The 19 year old boy who is making his own living must
and will spend his money; he often needs to make contracts for his own
good; and adults who take a young person (especially one who says he
is over 21) as a credit risk may be doing the minor and the economic
community a good service; consequently, there are strong reasons for
holding him to a contract if the court is satisfied that it was reasonably
fair when made. The problem of the emancipated minor usually arises
in conjunction with a misrepresentation of age. Consequently, the
courts who have statutes or sympathies which protect an innocent adult
in such a setting do not have to be concerned with the significance of
emancipation, although it may be enumerated in the listing of factors
pertinent to the decision; and the courts who are willing to disregard
misrepresentation are not likely to consider emancipation to be important.
F. Minors' Contracts "Pursuant to Statute"
A very nice question involving the infancy doctrine is whether it is
assumed to persist generally so that a statute which does not specifically
provide that minors are not exempted from a certain requirement or
privilege will be taken not to affect minors' capacities.19 7 Some argue
that a statutory enactment is assumed to apply to everybody unless a
194 See In re Greer, 184 So. 2d 104 (La. Ct. App. 1966). A 13 year old girl married and
became a widow when she was 14. The Louisiana courts held that her emancipation
(and majority status) was not revoked by the husband's death.
195 See BLACK, LAW DICrONARY 603 (4th ed. 1951).
196 See 1 J. FA-m. L. 140 (1961), discussing Merrick v. Stephens, 337 S.V.2d 71S (Mo.
1960).
197 But see IDAHO STAT. § 32-105 (1947).
A minor cannot disaffirm an obligation otherwise valid, entered into by him under
the express authority or direction of a statute.
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special exemption is expressly stated in the statute. 10 Generally, it may
be assumed that the legislators really did not contemplate the problem
and the courts are called on to accommodate the different policies involved. 9
Much easier are the cases where the statute is designed to remove
the minority as a factor in certain kinds of contracts:
A few obligations because of public policy or implications
drawn from the statutes, are binding upon infants and cannot be
disaffirmed. Though an infant may disaffirm an executory promise
to marry, a marriage itself contracted by him is binding. A contract of apprenticeship at common law has been held binding, but
in the United States, aside from statute, is voidable by the infant.
A contract of enlistment in the armed forces may be made binding
upon an infant by statute. The matter depends in every case on
the construction of the statute in question. The undertaking of an
infant, by bond or contract to answer a charge of bastardy or to
support his bastard child, or consent to its adoption by the mother,
cannot be disaffirmed. The same is true of an infant's recognizance
or bail bond for his personal appearance or for the appearance of
another in court. 200
Special statutes are especially common for education loans201 and insurance. 202 Although it may be argued that contracts for loans under the
Servicemen's Readjustment Act20 ' are almost assuredly beneficial, such
an assumption about insurance contracts has been doubted. 20 4 The
198 See Kozac v. Lutheran Children's Aid Soc'y, 164 Ohio St. 335, 130 N.E2d 796
(1955). Burlovic v. Farmer, 162 Ohio 46, 120 N.E.2d 705 (1954); 2 Wu, srON, CONTRACTS
§ 233 (3d ed. 1959). In Kozac the court held that a signing over of children to an institution, in compliance with statute, by natural parents is irrevocable except with release
from the institution, and the fact that the natural mother was an infant at the tme does
not make the agreement voidable. The Court found that the statute (Onto REv. CODE
§ 5103.15) was not limited to agreements made by adults.
Burlovic holds that the statute of limitations for attacking a separation agreement
applies to minors as well as to adults. Prof. Williston states that § 24 of the U.S.A. which
protects bona fide purchasers applies equally to minors and was applied in Wallace v.
Francis, 39 Ala. App. 463, 103 So. 2d 831 (1958).
199 Cephalis v. Briscoe, 96 A.2d 602 (Md. App. 1953).
200 2 WZLUSTON, CONTRACTS § 228 (3d ed. 1959). But see 15 U. Prrr. L. REv. 643 (1954),
discussing Burlovic v. Farmer, 162 Ohio 46, 120 N.E.2d 705 (1954).
201 VA. CODE § 8-135.1 (1950).
202 Ky. REv. STAT. § 304.649 (1943).
203 Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, ch. 268, 58 Stat. 291.
204 Note, supra note 47, at 275.
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latter enabling legislation, which is much applauded by insurers,2 5
smacks more of lobbying pressure and is of doubtful consistency with
the doctrinal underpinning of the minor's right to disaffirm.
G. Third Parties' Signatures and Money
The law of infants' contracts reaches one of its most farcical planes
when a spouse's or parent's money or signature is involved in the contract made by the minor. If a mother wants to give a certain car to her
son, the contract of sale is binding if she buys the car herself and then
gives it to him but voidable by the minor if she gives him the money
and he makes the purchase pursuant to her instruction. -0 Similarly, a
minor-wife will be allowed to disaffirm a contract if her own money is
involved but not if she is spending her adult-husband's money. 07 The
burden of tracing the source of the money is seemingly put on the
other party.
Generally, it matters not that a parent has signed a statement approving the contract.20 8 The source of this rule is (in some jurisdictions) that no one who could possibly inherit an infant's lands acquired
by descent could be a guardian of that infant. In Vermont, a father
could so take and therefore could not be a guardian at common law.
Consequently, his approval in Vermont was thought to be of no significance when he signed his consent for his minor-son's promise. 9 Unfortunately, the rule spread to other states which did not even have the
underlying doctrinal basis. It seems doubtful in all but the rarest cases
that a parent would not have his son's best interest in mind when the
latter was contracting with third parties.2 10 To hold a minor to a contract approved by his parent would be an easy way to give infants the
protection we think they are due while not showing an utter disregard
for the position of the other party.
The situation becomes exceedingly interesting (and intolerable!)
205 Fallon, Contracts and Minors in Life Insurance, 439 INs. L.J. 473 (1959).

206 Holly v. Fredlund, 5 NJ. Misc. 50, 68 A.2d 338 (1949). But see Davis v. Cleland, 87
Ohio App. 403, 92 N.E.2d 827 (1950).
207 Bowling v. Sperry, 133 Ind. App. 692, 184 N.E.2d 901 (1962); note 188 supra.
208 See note 58 supra. But see AmL STAT. § 8827 (1927): "A contract entered into by
a minor over 15 years when approved by his parents or guardian, or, if he have neither,
without consent, is binding if not for a longer period than a year."
209 Note, 12 U. DET. L.J. 99, 100 (1949).
210 See Standard Motors, Inc. v. Raue, 37 Ala. App. 211, 65 So. 2d 89 (1953). The court
held that although a mother and sister had joined with the minor in buying a car,
the latter could disaffirm and get his money back even if the mother and sister were not
parties to the suit.
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when neither the minor nor his parent can make a binding consent to
a fair and beneficial agreement-the minor because of his privilege to
disaffirm until a reasonable time after his majority and the father because no one is allowed to speak for the minor in a way which is binding on the minor. For example, is there to be no protection for a doctor
who operates on a minor unless he has a court decree or unless it can
be deemed a necessary? One trial judge has asked whether every high
school football player runs the risk of an assault and battery action
whenever he tackles an opponent who can disaffirm any theoretical
consent he has supposedly given. 21 ' It seems incredible that in these
situations there is, possibly, no one who can give a binding consent on
behalf of the minor.
The effect of an adult's signature on an infant's contract is not
always certain because the adult might be found to be a camouflage for
the real contracting party,21 2 a mere approver without consequence,21
a co-maker 214 or the actual contracting party. 215 It is often difficult to
know whether a decision on the merits leads to or follows from the labeling made by the court.
H. The Minor as a Businessman
What is to be done about the minor who has his own business? The
ultra-protective states do nothing and supposedly the minor can disaffirm his contracts as usual. Surprisingly enough, there are no postwar cases presenting such a factual pattern. 2 6 Virginia regards a minor
who engages in business as holding himself out as an adult and consequently requires him to warn other parties of the contracting dangers
resulting from his youth. 217 Georgia has the most restrictive legislation:
211 Lacey v. Laird, 166 Ohio St. 12, 139 N.E.2d 25, 34 (1956). The court held that a
minor could disaffirm her consent given to doctor for operation on her nose.
212 Bagalio v. Hoar, 118 Vt. 384, 110 A.2d 719 (1955); Amado v. Ken-Mac Motors, 83
R.I. 452, 119 A.2d 125 (1955); Harseim v. Cohen, 25 S.W. 977 (rex. Civ. App. 1894). In
Harseim the father tried to carry out his business transactions in the name of his Infant
daughter, hoping to be able to disaffirm contracts made in her name when they proved
to be disadvantageous, the court holding that she could not disaffirm if there were fraud.
213 Reeme v. Motors Securities Co., 51 So.2d 833 (La. Ct. App. 1951); see note 209
supra.
214 Raden v. Laurie, 120 Cal. App. 778, 262 P.2d 61 (1953); Campbell v. Fender, 218
Ark. 290, 235 S.W.2d 957 (1951). In Raden, infant Piper Laurie could disaffirm her part
of the contract but her mother, who had also signed, could not disaffirm her part.
215 Kruse v. Rhodes, 336 Ill. App. 537, 84 N.E.2d 688 (1949).
216 But see notes 6 and 15 supra.
217 VA. CODE § 8-135 (1950):
If any minor now transacting business or who may hereafter transact business as a
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If an infant, by permission of his parent or guardian, or by permission of law, practices any profession or trade, or engages in
business as an adult, he shall be bound for all contracts connected
with such profession, trade, or business. 218
Some states provide that an infant may not be an incorporator or an
officer or director of a corporation.219 0Of course, the minor can be a
stockholder and some states allow him to disaffirm his contract of purchase in case the stock values drop.220 With over 450,000 minor stockholders221 this possibility well illustrates just how much a fish-out-ofwater the infancy doctrine is in a modem credit society where teenagers are often quite likely to play the stock market with great sophistication.
Most of the cases dealing with the problem of the minor in business
have involved minors who were partners.22 2 Can an infant recover his
original contribution to the partnership?
.. the capital contributed by the minor may be subject to the
creditors of the partnership and may not be withdrawn until all
creditors have been satisfied. Nor may the infant claim that the
firm debts should be satisfied by the adult partners' capital, leaving his intact. This is perhaps based on historical reasons concerning the status of a partnership so far as the capital contributed to
the operation of the business is concerned and even an infant may
not escape liability so far as the capital contributed. Even though
the capital contributed by the minor may be subject to the claims
of the creditors, the creditors cannot hold the infant personally
liable for any debts above his share of the capital contributed.2
The foreign jurisdictions exhibit two schools of thought: (1)
trader fail to disclose by a sign in letters easy to be read, kept conspicuously posted
at the house -wherein such business is transacted and also by a notice published for
two weeks in a newspaper printed in the city, town or county wherein the same is
transacted if there be any such newspaper, the fact that he is a minor, all property,

stock and choses in action acquired or used in such business shall as to creditors of
any such person be liable for the debts of such person and no plea of infancy shall
be allowed.
§ 20-203 (1933).
See Kimball v. Kimball Bros., 143 Ohio St. 500, 56 N.E.2d 60 (1943).
220 See Burnet v. Chapin, 274 I1. App. 186 (1934).
221 See note 87 supra.
222 See Shemper v. Hancock Bank, 206 Misc. 775, 40 So. 2d 742 (1919). But see Huffman
v. Bates, 348 S.W2d. 363 (Mo. C. App. 1961). In Shcmper, the court, en bane, held that a
minor cannot be a partner.
223 Denton, Infants' Contracts: Rights and Remedies, 28 TEN.N. L REv. 395, 402 (1961).
218 GA. CODE
219

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 1967

49

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 2 [1967], Art. 4

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1:205

that the infant may recover such contributions less the amounts
received by him, and (2) that he cannot recover such contributions
unless he was induced to enter into the contract through the
224
fraudulent representations of the adult.
However, if a promise to contribute remains executory, this may not
be enforced against the disaffirming minor.225 Sometimes there are nice
questions as to whether a minor was acting for himself individually or
226
as a partner.
I. Model Statutory Schemes and Conclusion
The Columbia Law Review, in an article which suggests that the
need for protecting minors in their contractual relationship is clear
and perhaps greater than ever before,227 sets forth a statutory scheme
which includes three types of statutes:
To provide a flexible system by which a minor could be bound
to his contractual promises three types of statutes would be necessary. For the minor who is mature and desires to engage in business, the courts should be empowered, after adequate inquiry, to
remove all the disabilities of infancy. Another provision is needed
to cover the situation in which the minor is unready for complete
removal of disabilities, but should be bound to an isolated contract. Courts should be empowered, on petition of either party, to
approve single contracts in such instances. Such a provision would
enable an adult to protect himself so long as he has not overreached. Finally, as to contracts, which by their subject matter
cannot be other than fair and beneficial, the minor should be
bound unconditionally. This would eliminate intervention by the
court, while guaranteeing that the minor is not imposed upon. In
those instances when the minor has not been bound to contract
by one of the above procedures there remain various problems
consequent upon his disaffirmance- misrepresentation or engaging in business. A fair and adequate solution to the problem rpight
be to deny any power to disaffirm to a minor who has, by misrepresenting his age in writing in a separate instrument, led an adult
reasonably to believe him capable of contracting. In addition, a
224
225
226
227

Sacco v. Schallus, 11 N.J. Super. 197, 78 A.2d 143, 146 (1950).
Id. at 145.
See Frye v. Yasi, 327 Mass. 724, 101 N.E.2d 128 (1951).
Note, supra note 47.
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minor engaging in business should be required to disclose his age
to anyone with whom he deals. 22 8
This statutory scheme seems to have merit if one accepts the initial
premise of the article that minors need the protection. It appears that
this need has not been adequately demonstrated; consequently, the
proposed statute seems premature.
It has been the argument of this article that we cannot know what
kinds of rules to make until we know more clearly what the goal to be
reached by the infancy doctrine is.229 Furthermore, it has been contended that if the goal is to protect certain weak members of society,
the legislature should determine in an intelligent manner who qualifies for this protection and why. This requires, inter alia, a more scientific study of children's maturation patterns.
A thorough analysis of the problem may show that hard rules of
thumb will distort the objectives we seek, which would seem to be the
protection of certain members of society at the least possible cost to
others. It is difficult, if not impossible, to maintain a defense for the
present general rule which provides a conclusive presumption that a
minor is incapable of bringing sufficient discretion to a contract until
he is 21 or thereabouts. Seemingly, it would be preferable to adopt
the approach used by some jurisdictions in criminal cases:2 3 0 below a
certain age there is a conclusive presumption allowing avoidance because the likelihood of there being a minor contractor of sufficient discretion is so small that we do not want to waste the judicial machinery
in investigating the question; above that age for a certain period there
will be a presumption against the minor's having sufficient discretion;
then for a higher age bracket there is a rebuttable presumption that
228 Id. at 276-77.
229 Comment, supra note 2, at 235.
For a statutory scheme to be effective in this area, it must fulfill the following
objectives:
(1) Protect the truly immature minor, but allow him to bind himself to those
contracts which are truly beneficial,
(2) Allow the "older minor" full capacity to bind himself on contracts;
(3) Give as much protection as possible to unsuspecting adults.
Ibid.
230 Note, When Is a Youth Not a Youthl?, 15 SYRAcusE L. REv. 705, 712 (1964):
A child under the age of 7 is conclusively presumed to be incapable of committing
a crime. A child of the age of 7 years and under the age of 12 years is also presumed incapable of committing a crime, but the presumption may be overcome by
proof that he had sufficient understanding of the act charged against him to know
that it was wrong. Citing N.Y. PrNA. LAw §§ 816, 817.
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the minor needs no protection; and finally we reach an age where one
contracts just as an adult. This plan seems to compromise chronological
and mental age systems2 1 in a way deserving of serious consideration
by the lawmakers.
After resolving the major questions, the legislator faces a series of
smaller problems which were mostly introduced in the final section of
this article: it must be determined whether the rules will be the same
for all kinds of contracts, real and personal, commercial and noncommercial; when a quasi-contract, estoppel or tort theory should be applied; where the responsibilities in avoidance lie, i.e., will there always
be a duty in the minor to disaffirm; the obligations of the minor to
account for his use of the goods or services; the significance of the approval of a contract by the minor's parent or spouse or some other
third party; the protection to be afforded a minor who engages in business in various roles; the allocation of various burdens of proof; and
the place of the minor's protection in our general statutory law and
value systems, e.g., when will we prefer minor's voidability rather than
the concept of the protection of the bona fide purchaser or negotiability.
The present case law often gives conflicting, poorly reasoned, and
generally unsatisfactory answers to many of these questions. This in
great part is caused by the fact that judges either (1) do not properly
analyze a problem because they have not really examined the goal to
be fostered through the infancy doctrine, or (2) they see the rationale
upon which the voidability concept is based to be so unrealistic when
applied to modem economically sophisticated youth that they rebel
against the assumption that the minor needs the protection. It has been
the primary purpose of this article to invite a reconsideration of the
theoretical underpinning of the law of minor's contracts, hoping that a
rationalization of the major issues-especially as to the goal-will then
lead to a rationalization of the case law.
231 Id. at 727:

It is suggested that in terms of mental age and social age a person may actually be
a child when the law calls him an adult.
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